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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,' which sharply limited the role of federal
securities law in redressing acts of corporate malfeasance, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in Singer v. Magnavox Co. and its progeny,' expanded
the protection available to investors in the context of squeeze-out merg-
ers.3 According to some proponents of corporate accountability, how-
ever, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. UOP,
InC.4 indicates a return to the "race for the bottom" in state corporate
law.5
1. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
2. Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1034 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (DeL 1977); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
3. Every state's corporation law provides a statutory procedure by which two or more cor-
porations can be combined into a single corporation even though less than all shareholders ap-
prove. A squeeze-out merger involves the use of this statutory merger device by the principal
owner of the corporation to eliminate the minority shareholders from the corporation. In Singer,
the Delaware Supreme Court required the majority to act pursuant to a valid business purpose,
other than eliminating the minority interests, in effecting a cash-out merger as well as to act with
entire fairness to the minority. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 978-80 (Del. 1977). Dela-
ware thus started a trend toward increased protection of minority rights often at the expense of the
majority's desire for flexibility in managing the affairs of the enterprise.
4. 457 A.2d 701 (DeL 1983).
5. The "race for the bottom" refers to various state efforts to attract more corporations to
incorporate in their particular state in order to generate franchise tax revenues by providing a
minimal framework for businesses to operate free from restrictions or control. The eminent Pro-
fessor William L. Cary, who also served as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, viewed state corporation law as a "race for the bottom" in which Delaware had emerged
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2
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The court in Weinberger eliminated the Singer business purpose re-
quirement 6 and elevated the "entire fairness" test to the sole criterion
to judge the terms of a squeeze-out 7 merger.8 The Weinberger court
victorious. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
705 (1974). Another commentator asserted that "It]he sovereign state of Delaware is in the busi-
ness of selling its corporation law." Comment, Lawfor Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation
Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 861-63 (1969).
In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the Delaware Supreme Court strictly construed
the demand requirement and formulated a restrictive test for determining futility. Aronson thus
increases the burden on a shareholder who is attempting to overcome the presumption of board
independence. The decision may be viewed as further evidence of Delaware's return to the "race
for the bottom." See M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SE-
CURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE (1983); Ashman, Delaware Stifens Rules on Parent Subsidiary Merg-
ers, 69 A.B.A. J. 966 (July, 1983); Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-out Mergers:
Weinberger Eclipses Singer, 39 Bus. LAW 1 (1983); Burgman & Cox, Reappraising the Role of the
Shareholders in the Modern Corporation: Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness in
Freezeouts, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 593; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974); Clark, Delaware Does A 180 ,4ppraisal Remedy Exclusive, 5
SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. (CLARK BOARDMAN) 49 (1983); Hamermesh, Going-Private Mergers
dAfter UOP, 16 REV. SEC. REG. (S. & P.) 943 (1983); Payson & Inskip, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.:
Its Practical Signicance in the Planning and Defense of Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83
(1983); Prickett & Hanrahan, Weinberger v. UOP: Delaware's Effort to Preserve a Level Playing
Fieldfor Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 59 (1983); Sardell, Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 7 CORP. L. REV. 72 (1984); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 245 (1983); Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-
Out Mergers. The Promise ofWeinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); Note, Achiev-
ing Fairness in Corporate Cash Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, 16 CONN. L. REV. 95 (1983); Note,
Delaware Redenes "Entire Fairness" Test for Cash-Out Mergers and Suggests More Liberal Ap-
praisal Remedy, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1049 (1983); Note, Delaware Supreme Court Extends Fairness
Standard of Appraisal of Minority Shareholders' Stock in A Cash-Out Merger and Eliminates the
Business Purpose Test, 5 WHITTIER L. REv. 661 (1983); Herzel & Coiling, The Use of Independent
Negotiating Committees in Squeeze-Out Mergers, 190 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 34, col. 4; Borden,
Delaware Court Writes.4 Fresh Script For New Going Private Pelformances, 189 N.Y.L.J., June 6,
1983, at 25, col. 5; Stein & Hayworth, Merger Case Will Impact on Minority Shareholders, 189
N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1983, at 25, col. 3; Bernstein, Somethingfor Everyone In Cash Out Merger, 189
N.Y.LJ., Mar. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
6. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 978-80 (Del. 1977).
7. A cash-out or freeze-out merger, also known as a going private transaction, is a merger in
which the controlling persons of a corporation eliminate public or minority shareholders while
retaining ownership of the business. Squeeze-outs fall into three distinct categories: (1) two-step
mergers (the tender offer and the merger), (2) going private transactions, and (3) mergers of long-
held affiliates. See Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
487, 490-94 (1976).
For an in-depth analysis of the going private concept, see A. BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE (1982);
A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrrIEs LAW § 4.7 (Supp. 1977); F.H. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINOITY
SHAREHOLDERS (1975); Brudney, A Note on "Going-Private,"61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975); Kerr,
Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33 (1975); Moore, Going
Private: Techniques and Problems of Eliminating the Public Shareholder, I J. CORP. L. 321 (1976);
Solomon, Going Priate: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposalsfor
Number 31
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expressed a preference for the appraisal remedy9 for minority share-
holders in such mergers except in cases of "fraud, misrepresentation,
self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets or gross and palpable
overreaching . ,,*"10 The court expanded, however, the determina-
tion of "fair value" under the appraisal remedy.lI
The Weinberger decision limited the scope of protection available to
minority shareholders under Delaware law. Significantly, in order to
obtain relief in most instances, minority stockholders are required to
perfect their rights under the cumbersome procedural requirements of
the Delaware appraisal statute.1 2 Hence, the court's preference for ap-
praisal effectively will limit the ability of minority shareholders to
Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness ofthe Dissenting Stockholders
Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964); Note, Federal Regulation of the Going Private
Phenomenon, 6 Cum. L. REV. 141 (1975); Comment, "Going Private'"--The Insiders Fiduciary Duty
and Rule 10b-5: Is Fairness Requisite 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 565 (1976); Comment, SEC Proposed
"Going Private" Rule, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 184 (1978); Comment, Protection ofMinority Sharehold-
ers: Freeze-Outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976).
8. 457 A.2d at 714.
9. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983 Replacement Vol. ) (setting forth Delaware ap-
praisal remedy). Although appraisal is available in virtually all states, the Delaware courts have
considerable experience with appraisal proceedings and have developed an integrated body of
appraisal law. Therefore, in the discussion of the Weinberger decision, this Article will primarily
address Delaware case law. For a comparison of the Delaware appraisal statute with other state's
appraisal statutes, see Banks, Measuring the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 32
(1974).
For further commentary on the appraisal process, see, e.g., Ballantine & Sterling, Upsetting
Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California, 27 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 644 (1939); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Greene, Freeze-OutMergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
487 (1976); Hainline, Dissenting Shareholders-Fair Cash Value, 28 DET. LAW. 173 (1960); Kerr &
Letts, AppraisalProceduresfor Dissenting Delaware Stockholders, 20 Bus. LAW. 1093 (1965); Lat-
tin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1931);
Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1930);
Note, Dissenting Stockholder'r Right of Appraisal-Determination of Value, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1021
(1953). Comment, Valuation of Dissenter's Stock Under the Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1453 (1966); Comment, Dissenting Stockholder's Right to the "Fair Value" of His Stock, 20 MD. L.
REv. 82 (1960); Comment, Valuation of Dissenting Shareholders'Stock Under an Appraisal Statute,
23 Mo. L. REV. 223 (1958).
10. 457 A.2d at 714.
11. Id at 712-14. Under the appraisal remedy, a shareholder who dissents from a merger can
compel the surviving corporation to purchase his shares at their fair value. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (Replacement Vol. 1983) ("The Court shall direct the payment of the fair
value of the shares, together with interest, if any, by the surviving or resulting corporation to the
shareholders entitled thereto.upon the surrender to the corporation of the certificates representing
such stock ....").
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (Replacement Vol. 1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2
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bring suit for breach of fiduciary duty to circumstances in which they
can prove fraud or one of the other Weinberger exceptions.13 Because
of the severe deficiencies associated with the appraisal statute,14 the
limitation on alternative remedies lessens the protection available to
minority shareholders. The Weinberger decision also has important
implications under federal law. Under the rationale of Goldberg v.
Meridor'5 and its progeny,16 the success of a federal suit under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-517 promul-
gated thereunder may well depend on the availability of state court
relief. 18
After canvassing Delaware law prior to Weinberger, the Article ad-
dresses the implications of this important decision. Weinberge~s appli-
cation of the "entire fairness" test as the sole standard to scrutinize
squeeze-out mergers raises a number of intriguing issues, which the Ar-
ticle examines. In addition, significant developments in other jurisdic-
tions are discussed where appropriate. Thereafter, the Article analyzes
the role of the investment banker in rendering a fairness opinion pursu-
ant to a freeze-out merger,' 9 focusing on the fiduciary duties an invest-
ment banker may owe to minority shareholders when the banker is
appraising the value of the minority's interest. The last section of the
Article discusses Weinbergers impact on the federal securities laws,
and in particular, SEC rules 13e-3 and lOb-5.2 °
II. PRIOR DELAWARE CASE LAW
In 1977, the Delaware Supreme Court began a new era21 in state
13. 457 A.2d at 714.
14. See, e.g., Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 222, 233 (1962) ("the only things certain [in the appraisal process] are the uncertainty,
the delay, and the expense").
15. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); see infra notes 272-89 and
accompanying text.
16. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 638 (3rd Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm
Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. Alabama Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979);
Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R.§ 240.10b-5 (1984). See infranotes 262-63 for the text
of section 10(b) and rule lob-S.
18. See cases cited supra note 16.
19. See infra notes 193-250 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 251-289 and accompanying text.
21, For a discussion of Singers effect on Delaware corporate law, see M. STEINBERG, SECUR-
ITIEs REGULATION: LIABILITIES & REMEDIES § 8.04 (1984); M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTER-
Number 3]
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corporation law.22 Until that time, commentators characterized many
states as in a "race for the bottom" in their accommodation of the inter-
ests of management over the rights of shareholders. 3 The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,24
which demonstrated the likelihood of reduced federal regulation of
management malfeasance, influenced states to assume a more activist
NAL AFFAIRs-A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 177-81 (1983); Ferrara &
Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263
(1980).
22. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407
A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus. Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
Portions of this discussion were derived from other works by the author: M. STEINBERO, COR-
PORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 177-81 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS]; M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION:
LABILTIES AND REMEDIES § 8.04 (1984) [hereinafter cited as SECURITIES REGULATION]; Ferrara
& Steinberg, The Interplay Between State Corporation & Federal Securities Law-Santa Fe, Singer,
Burks, Maldonado, Their Progeny & Beyond, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7-11 (1982); Ferrara & Stein-
berg, A Reappraisal ofSanta Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 277-
81 (1980); Gonson & Steinberg, The SE. C. s Administrative and Legislative Programs Aimed at
Regulating Corporate Internal Affairs, in STANDARDS FOR REGULATING CORPORATE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS 317, 337-40 (1981); Steinberg, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and
Tender Contestsfor Corporate Control, 30 EMORY L.J. 168, 198-208, 223-33, 252-54 (1981); Stein-
berg, Application of/he Business Judgment Rule and Related Judicial Principles-Reflectionsfrom a
CorporateAccountability Perspective, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 903 (1981); Steinberg, Maldonado In
Delaware" Special Litigation Committees-An Unsafe Have; 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 381 (1982); Stein-
berg, State Court Decisions After Santa Fe, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 85 (1981); Steinberg, The American
Law Institute's Draft Restatement on Corporate Governance: The Business Judgment Rule, Related
Princ4iles and Some General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295 (1983); Steinberg, The Use of
Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1
(1980).
23. See, g., Cary, supra note 5, at 705; Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Drafts-
man, 42 CONN. B.J. 409, 410 (1968); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way orAll
the Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976); Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976); Manning, The Shareholders'4ppraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, g 245 (1962); Schwartz, Federal Chartering ofCorporations: An
Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972); Comment, Law For Sale: A Study f the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law f1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 898 (1969).
24. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Santa Fe court held that, absent "manipulation" or "decep-
tion," section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder
do not cover breaches of fiduciary duty. In Santa Fe, the minority shareholders objected to the
terms of a short-form merger that had met the requirements of the applicable state statute. Rather
than pursuing tleir state appraisal remedies, the shareholders claimed that the gross undervalua-
tion of the shares was itself a "fraud" within the meaning of rule lob-5.
In rejecting this "new fraud" concept, the Court commented that the majority's failure to pro-
vide the minority with advance notice of the merger was not a material nondisclosure because
"under Delaware law [the plaintiffs] could not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal
proceeding [was] their sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness in the terms
of a merger." 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
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role in protecting shareholders' interests.25 Indeed, in Singer v.
Magnavox Co.,26 the Delaware Supreme Court viewed Santa Fe as a
"confirmation by the Supreme Court of the responsibility of a state to
govern the internal affairs of corporate life."'2 7
4. Singer and Its Progeny
In Singer, minority shareholders, whom the majority had frozen out
by a merger, sued for nullification of the merger and compensatory
damages. Although the merger satisfied the procedural requirements
of the applicable state statute,28 the plaintiffs alleged that the sole pur-
pose of the merger was to eliminate the minority and that the majority
had offered grossly inadequate compensation for the minority's stock.29
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that appraisal
was the exclusive remedy. 0 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed
and stated that "a § 251 merger, made for the sole purpose of freezing
out minority shareholders, is an abuse of corporate process; and...
states a cause of action for violation of a fiduciary duty."31 Moreover,
the court stressed that the existence of a valid business purpose would
not preclude relief to the minority shareholders:
On the contrary, the fiduciary obligation of the majority to the minority
stockholders remains and proof of a purpose, other than such freeze out,
without more, will not necessarily discharge it. In such case the court will
scrutinize the circumstances for compliance with the Sterling rule of "en-
tirefairness' and if it finds a violation thereof, will grant such relief as
32equity may require.
Under Singer, therefore, if a plaintiff alleges that the purpose of the
merger was improper, the majority shareholders must prove a proper
business purpose. In addition, even if proof of a valid business purpose
exists, a court must scrutinize the transaction for its "entire fairness"
25. For works discussing Santa Fe and its progeny, see authorities cited supra note 22.
26. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
27. Id at 976 n.6.
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Replacement Vol. 1983).
29. 380 A.2d at 972.
30. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976).
31. 380 A.2d at 980.
32. Id (emphasis added). The Singer court relied on the Sterling rule, Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, (Del. 1952), which stated that the majority must "bear
the burden of establishing [the transaction's] entire fairness ... [which must] pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts." Id at 298, 93 A.2d at 110. See 380 A.2d at 976.
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and award appropriate relief if a violation is found.33
Singer ushered in a new era of Delaware corporate law.34  Subse-
quent cases reaffirmed Singer5 and extended its principles to short-
form mergers.36 These cases did not, however, foreclose a merger
designed primarily to advance a majority shareholder's interest if the
merger had a bona fide purpose and was entirely fair to the minority.37
33. For further discussion of Singer, see, e.g., M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AF-
FAIRS, supra note 22, at 177-181; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87
YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Elfin, Changing Standards and the Future Course of Freezeout Mergers, 5 J.
CORP. LAW 261 (1980); Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 21; Rothehild, Going Private, Singer, and
Rule 13e-3: What Are the Standardsfor Fiduciaries 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (1979); Steinberg, State
Court Decisions After Santa Fe, 9 SEC. REG. LJ. 85 (1981); Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash
Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. REV. 1101 (1978).
34. Prior to Santa Fe, there was some authority that, under relevant state law, the majority
could not eliminate the minority shareholders in a cash-out merger transaction, unless the major-
ity could demonstrate a valid business purpose. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d
563, 571 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (interpreting Georgia law); see also
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 9-10, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (1962) (appraisal remedy
exclusive absent fraud or illegality).
35. From these decisions the courts established that a majority shareholder's fiduciary duty
was not satisfied by relegating the minority shareholders to their statutory appraisal remedy. See,
eg., Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Young v. Valhi, Inc.,
382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978); see also Coleman v. Taub, 487 F. Supp. 118 (D. Del. 1980), rev'd,
638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Delaware law); Fins v. Pearlman, 424 A.2d 305, 308 (Del.
1980) (intrinsic fairness of terms of the settlement and not the proper purpose for merger is the
standard applied to the settlement of an action challenging the merger); Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (distinguishing entire fairness under appraisal statute from that of
entire fairness standard under Singer).
In addition, a majority shareholder could not affect a merger solely for the purpose of removing
the minority. For example, in Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978), the chancery
court issued a preliminary injunction barring the merger. The Court held that, despite manage-
ment's assertion that the merger would result in tax savings and the avoidance of future conflicts
of interest, "the basic purpose behind the merger. . . is effectuation of a long standing decision on
the part of Contran to eliminate the minority shares of Valhi by whatever means as might be
found to be workable." Id at 1378.
Even if the merger was consummated for a proper purpose the minority shareholder was enti-
tled to judicial review of the entire fairness of the transaction. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977) ("entire fairness" test applies not only to the
price offered for the stock but to all aspects of the transaction").
36. Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najiar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1033 (Del. 1979). Applying the Singer prin-
ciples, the Naffar court reasoned that "the need to recognize and enforce such equitable principles
is probably greater when the size of the minority is smaller." Id at 1036. See also Balotti, The
Elimination of the Minority Interest by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of the General Corporation
Law of Delaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 63, 73 (1976) (contending that no substantive difference
between mergers under the long-form statute and the short-form statute exists).
37. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del. 1977). Thus, the
Tanzer court held:
As a stockholder, [the parent corporation] need not sacrifice its own interest in dealing
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2
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On the other hand, a complaint alleging that a merger was unfair or
that its purpose was to eliminate the minority frequently withstood a
motion to dismiss. 38 In other cases decided by the Delaware Supreme
Court,a9 the court held that the fiduciary obligation owed by a majority
shareholder to the minority includes a duty of "complete candor."
This duty requires the majority to reveal germane facts and circum-
stances surrounding the tender offer or shareholder vote.40 Moreover, if
a fiduciary breached one of his duties, the "rescissory" measure of
with a subsidiary; but that interest must not be suspect as a subterfuge, the real purpose
of which is to rid itself of unwanted minority shareholders in the subsidiary. That would
be a violation of Singer and any subterfuge or effort to escape its mandate must be scruti-
nized with care and dealt with by the Trial Court. And, of course, in any event, a bona
fide purpose notwithstanding, [the parent] must be prepared to show that it has met its
duty, imposed by Singer and Sterling... of "entire fairness" to the minority.
Id at 1124 (citation omitted).
One commentator has contended that these Delaware cases suggest that a cash-out merger that
served no corporate purpose could nonetheless pass scrutiny if it served a purpose of the fiduciary.
Rothschild, supra note 33, at 215. Moreover, a number of commentators have asserted that, by
permitting the majority's bona fide purpose to satisfy Singers first prong, Tanzer, in practical
effect, virtually eliminated the business purpose test. See, eg., Weiss, The Law of Take-Out Merg-
ers.: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 664 (1981).
38. See Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (DeL Ch. 1977). In Kemp, the chancery court held that
if there is a reasonable probability that the minority shareholders might prevail, the case must
proceed to trial:
[lilt being only at trial that the court can give the required careful scrutiny to the testi-
mony adduced subject to objection and cross examination as well as to other evidence
offered in an orderly fashion and also test the credibility of witnesses before reaching a
determination as to whether or not the transaction under attack is in fact entirely fair to
minority stockholders ....
Id at 245. See Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372, 1378 (Del. Ch. 1978). A later case held,
however, that under certain limited circumstances, a court may subject a complaint attacking a
merger to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409
A.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Del. Ch. 1979), vacated, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
39. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) (Lynch I); Lynch v. Vickers
Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977) (Lynch 1).
40. Lynch , 383 A.2d at 279. The fiduciary duty owed by the majority requires complete
disclosure of all the "germane" facts and circumstances. Id at 282. "Germane" in this context
may be defined as information that a reasonable shareholder would consider important in making
his investment or voting decision. Cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (materi-
ality, for purpose of SEC rule 14a-9 disclosure, consists of facts which a shareholder would con-
sider important in determining how to vote). AccordNelson v. Gammon, 647 F.2d 710 (6th Cir.
1981) (considering Kentucky law to the effect that full disclosure of a transaction's terms plus
shareholders' retention of rights is sufficient); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir. 1981)
(under Louisiana law, corporate officers and directors are obliged "to disclose facts within their
knowledge to shareholders and to deal with them in an atmosphere of trust and confidence"). See
general, Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and The Corporation 's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 65 GEo. L.J. 935
(1979); Note, Disclosure of Material Inside Informatiorn An Affirmative Corporate Duty, 1980
ARiz. ST. LJ. 935.
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41damages was proper.
B. Reaction of Other States
A number of other states have addressed the issues raised by the
court in Singer. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court appar-
ently has adopted the Singer rationale. 42 The Indiana Supreme Court
has adopted the first prong of the Singer rule, holding that a merger
must advance a corporate purpose to withstand attack under Indiana
corporate law.43 The Indiana court declined, however, to review merg-
ers under the "entire fairness" standard. It reasoned that such scrutiny
would require inordinate judicial intrusion into a corporation's internal
affairs.44 Without explicitly adopting both of Singeis prongs, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii asserted that "a merger effected for the sole
purpose of freezing out the minority interest is a violation of fiduciary
principles. .. .
41. Lynch II, 429 A.2d at 501. "Rescissory damages" are the monetary equivalent of rescis-
sion where actual rescission of the merger has become impractical due to the passage of time. In
effect, a rescissory measure of damages awards the equivalent value of the stock at the time of
resale, if applicable, or at the time of the judgment, thus allowing the minority shareholder to
enjoy the increase in value that the majority shareholder had as a result of acquiring and holding
the shares. Id See generally 12A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 5598 (1980). But
see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704, 714 (Del. 1983) (rejecting the application of the
rescissory measure to the extent that it limits a stockholder's monetary relief to a single damage
formula).
42. Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).
43. Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 377, 388, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977).
44. The court explained as follows:
The case before us is similar to the case of Singer v. Magnavox Co... . In that case, the
Supreme Court of Delaware. . . relied upon agency principles of fiduciary duty to hold
that a corporate merger is subject to judicial scrutiny concerning its "entire fairness" to
minority shareholders. We see no need to go that far in deciding the question before us.
Under the Delaware view, it appears that every proposed merger would be subject to
having its bona fides determined by judicial review. We do not believe the judiciary
should intrude into corporate management to that extent.
Id
45. Perl v. I.U. Int'l Corp., 61 Hawaii 622, 640, 607 P.2d 1036, 1046 (1980). See also Twenty
Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland law
prohibits majority shareholder's use of control for ulterior purposes adverse to the interest of the
corporation and its stockholders); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464,
471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599 (1969) ("[alny use to which [majority shareholders] put the corporation
or their power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must
not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's business"). As the Hawaii Supreme
Court stated. "[A]lthough Ahmanson did not involve a merger, it appears clear from the language
of the opinion that the California Supreme Court would apply the fiduciary duty of good faith
and inherent fairness to such a situation." 61 Hawaii at 604 n.12, 607 P.2d at 1047 n.12.
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On the other hand, some states have expressly rejected the Singer
rationale either by statute or judicial decision. For example, a Minne-
sota statute provides that corporations may merge "with or without a
business purpose"'' and that the remedy for lack of "entire fairness" is
appraisal.47 The Connecticut Supreme Court expressly held that ap-
praisal is a minority shareholder's sole remedy for any alleged unfair-
ness in the terms of a merger.48 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
taking a somewhat different course, held that appraisal is the solepost-
merger remedy for dissenting minority shareholders.49 The Penn-
sylvania court, however, recognized the minority's right in the pre-
merger period to seek injunctive relief against the consummation of the
merger.50 Hence, although all courts and legislatures have not followed
Singer, some have recognized that, under certain circumstances, ag-
grieved minority shareholders may bring an action in state court to en-
join a merger that has not been consummated.5'
III. WEINBERGER V UOP, INc.-AN OVERVIEW
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,52 the former minority shareholders of
46. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.601 (West 1981).
47. General comment (3) of the statute states that "the remedy for lack of 'entire fairness' in
the transaction in this act is the appraisal section; by obtaining the fair value of the shares, the
dissenting minority shareholder recoups the investment." Id
48. Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 272, 422 A.2d 311, 318 (1979). See CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 33-373(f) (1983). AccordJones v. Highway Inn, Inc., 424 So.2d 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Morris v. Columbia Apts. Corp., 323 I11. App. 292, 55 N.E.2d 401 (1944); Gordon v.
Public Serv. Co., 101 N.H. 372, 143 A.2d 428 (1958); O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 186 Va. 325, 42
S.E.2d 269 (1947). However, when the plaintiffalleges fraud or illegality, appraisal clearly should
not be the exclusive remedy. See, ag., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983);
Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 382 N.E.2d 1030 (1978).
49. In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 524, 531-32, 412 A.2d 1099, 1103 (1980). See
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 805 (Purdon 1967); see also Note, Exclusiveness of the Appraisal
Remedy--Legilature Intended that AllActions Be BarredExceptfor an Appraisal After Consumma-
tion of Merger. In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 84 DICK L. REv. 543 (1980); Note, Interplay of
Rights of Stockholders Dissentingfrom Sale ofCorporate Assets, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 251 (1958).
50. 488 Pa. at 532-33, 412 A.2d at 1103-04; see Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp.
1328, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law, the court concluded that the majority had
not breached the fiduciary duty they owed to the minority in a merger).
5 1. Some states arguably limit the dissenting shareholders' rights to an appraisal proceeding
to determine fair value. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-163(a) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.16
(West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. CODE § 623(e) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); Wis. STAT. ANN.
1180.72 (West Supp. 1983-84). For further discussion of state legislation, see Roberts, The Status
of Minority Shareholders' Remediesfor Oppression After Santa Fe and Singer and the Question of
"Reasonable Investment Expectation" Valuation, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 16, 36-37 (1981).
52. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In a pre-trial ruling, the court dismissed the original complaint
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UOP brought suit for breach of fiduciary duty arising from a cash-out
merger between UOP and UOP's majority owner, the Signal Compa-
nies (Signal).53 The merger plan provided that UOP would merge with
Sigco, a wholly owned subsidiary of Signal, and that UOP's minority
shareholders would be cashed-out at $21 per share.54
A. Background
Signal was seeking a suitable investment for a cash surplus created
by its 1974 sale of an unrelated subsidiary." Accordingly, Signal's
chairman of the board and its president appointed two Signal officers
to perform an internal feasibility study concerning the acquisition of
the balance of UOP's outstanding shares. These four individuals were
directors of UOP and members of the Signal board. The study indi-
cated that UOP would be a good investment for Signal at any price up
to $24 per share.56 At no time did any person privy to the report share
its contents with "non-Signal" UOP directors or UOP minority share-
holders.57 After assessing the internal feasibility study, Signal's execu-
tives contacted UOP's president. Without disclosing the feasibility
study, they elicited UOP's president's response to an offer for the re-
for failure to state a cause of action. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979).
For a discussion of that opinion, see Note, Delaware Corporation Law.- Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.-A Limitation on Singer Fairness Standards 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 915 (1981). Plaintifis
amended complaint alleged specific acts of fraud or misrepresentation in order to meet the re-
quirement that a suit challenging a cash-out merger must allege acts of misconduct demonstrating
the unfairness of the merger to the minority. 457 A.2d at 703.
53. Id at 704. In 1974, Signal sold one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries for $420,000,000 in
cash. See Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599, aj'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974). Sig-
nal, due to its cash surplus, then became interested in UOP as a possible investment. Following
negotiations, Signal made a successful cash tender offer for 4,300,000 publicly held shares of UOP
and purchased 1,500,000 authorized but unissued shares from UOP. Signal purchased both at a
price of $21 per share.
Signal thereby became a 50.5% shareholder of UOP. Of the six directors elected by Signal to
UOP's thirteen member board, five were employees or directors of Signal. In 1975, the president
and chief executive officer of UOP retired. A former employee and executive vice-president of
one of Signal's wholly owned subsidiaries replaced him and assumed positions on the board of
directors of both UOP and Signal. 457 A.2d at 705.
54. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
55. See Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); supra note 53.
56. Two Signal officers prepared the feasibility study. Both were directors of UOP as well as
Signal and, in addition, Signal's board chairman and its president also served on both boards. 457
A.2d at 705.
57. Id at 708-09.
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maining UOP shares at a price of $20 to $21 per share. The UOP
president responded that he believed that the offer was fair.5 8
Signal placed severe time constraints on the response of UOP's man-
agement to its offer.59 Because of these time constraints UOP retained
the investment banking firm of Lehman Brothers, which was familiar
with UOP's financial position, to render a fairness opinion. ° After a
hurried review, Lehman Brothers concluded that the price of $21 was
fair.6 ' The outside directors then approved the merger proposal.62
Thereafter, a majority of the minority shares actually voting and at
least two-thirds of all outstanding shares approved the merger.63
The plaintiffs alleged that the UOP majority had breached its fiduci-
ary duty in two respects. According to the plaintiffs, the first breach
occurred when the majority caused the merger to go forward solely to
remove the minority's interest. Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the
majority offered a grossly inadequate price for the minority's interest.64
The lower court entered judgment for the defendants, concluding that
under Singer the defendants had met the burden of proving that the
merger was for a valid business purpose and that the merger satisfied
the entire fairness test.65 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the
58. Although a later press release and proxy statement indicated that the negotiations ad-
dressed the price offered, in fact no one negotiated on behalf of UOP for a price higher than $21
per share. UOP's president concluded that a price at the top of the proposed range (i.e., $20-$21)
would be suitable. He also expressed concern over UOP employees' job security as well as the
stock option incentive programs for key employees. The market price for UOP common stock
during this period was $14.50 per share. Id at 703-06.
59. Id at 706.
60. Id at 705-07.
61. Id at 706. The senior partner from Lehman Brothers filled in the $21 price per share on
the incomplete draft of the "fairness opinion letter" shortly before the directors' meeting. Id at
707.
62. Id at 703. The investment banker was originally a defendant but the plaintiffs subse-
quently dismissed it. Therefore, the court did not deal with any issues raised by the claims against
this defendant. Id at 703, n.3. See infra notes 193-250 and accompanying text.
63, At the annual shareholder meeting only 56 percent of the minority shares were actually
voted. Therefore, only 51.9% of the total minority shares voted for the merger. When Signal's
stock was added to the minority shares voting in favor, a total of 76.2% of UOP's outstanding
shares approved the merger. 457 A.2d at 708.
64. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1341 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983).
65. 426 A.2d at 1362-63 (DeL Ch. 1983). The Delaware Chancery Court stated that "Sterling
is the bedrock on which Singer, Tanzer and Roland International are built." Id at 1344 (citing,
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952)). The lower court
interpreted Singer as providing that the majority shareholder's purpose in seeking the merger on a
cash-out basis was a specific factor to be considered under the Sterling "entire fairness" review,
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lower court.66
B. The Delaware Supreme Court's Decision
Finding that the terms of the merger failed the entire fairness stan-
dard, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the majority had
breached its fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders. 7 The court
reasoned that the merger lacked fairness because "material information
necessary to acquaint those shareholders with the bargaining positions
of Signal and UOP, was withheld under circumstances amounting to a
breach of fiduciary duty. 68
The court indicated that the pecuniary relief afforded by the ap-
praisal provision69 ordinarily provides sufficient protection to minority
shareholders in a cash-out merger.70 The court then adopted a "more
liberal, less rigid and stylized approach to the valuation process,' ' 7 and
rejected any specific damages formula that purported to limit a share-
holder's monetary relief.72 Finally, the court abolished the business
and that if the majority's purpose was solely to eliminate the minority, then the majority had
breached its fiduciary duty. Id at 1343.
As one commentator recognized: "Left open after Sterling was the question whether appraisal
was the exclusive remedy in an action challenging a completed interested merger and whether a
majority stockholder had an absolute right to use his majority control to bring about a merger for
whatever reason he chose, subject only to the duty to pay a fair price." Sparks, State Regulation of
Conflict Transactions, in STANDARDS FOR REGULATING CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 235, 248
(1981).
66. 457 A.2d at 703.
67. Id
68. Id The court relied heavily on the existence and nondisclosure of the Signal feasibility
study, which indicated that a price of up to $24 per share was economically feasible for Signal.
Four of UOP's directors, who were also Signal executives, knew of the existence of the study but
never revealed it to UOP's board of directors or to the minority shareholders. Id at 712.
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Replacement Vol. 1983) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any stockholder who has complied with subsection (d) and has neither voted in
favor of the merger nor consented thereto shall be entitled to an appraisal by the
Court of Chancery of the fair value of his shares...
(d) Appraisal rights shall be perfected as follows:
(1) . . . each stockholder electing to demand appraisal of his shares shall deliver
to the corporation.., a written demand...
(2) . . . within 20 days after the date of mailing of the notice...
(h) After determining the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the Court shall appraise
the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger, together with a fair rate of
interest, if any ..... In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into
account all relevant factors....
70. 457 A.2d at 703, 715.
71. Id at 704.
72. Id at 705. The Weinberger court overruled Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497
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purpose requirement of Singer, hence relying solely upon the entire
fairness test.73 According to the Weinberger court, the fairness test to-
gether with the Chancellor's discretion to award necessary relief af-
forded ample protection to minority shareholders.74
Weinberger therefore stands for the proposition that appraisal is a
minority stockholders sole remedy in a freeze-out merger, except
where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corpo-
rate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are present. In those
circumstances, the court recognized that the expanded appraisal rem-
edy may not be adequate, leaving the Chancellor free to "fashion any
form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate including
rescissory damages. 75
The Weinberger decision represents a return by the Delaware courts
to the rule that minority shareholders are limited to the monetary fair
value of their stock.76 Although the Delaware high court expanded the
financial remedy available under the liberalized appraisal proceeding,
it left aggrieved minority shareholders with the choice between agree-
(Del. 1981) (Lynch I]) "to the extent that it purports to limit a stockholder's monetary relief to a
specific damage formula." 457 A.2d at 705. See 429 A.2d at 507-08 (McNeilly and Quillen, JJ.,
dissenting).
73. 457 A.2d at 715. The court pointed to the principle developed in Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 297, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952), that "where one stands on both sides of
a transaction [such as a parent-subsidiary merger], he has the burden of establishing its entire
fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts." 457 A.2d at 710. See also
Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), aft'd, 278 A.2d 467 (1970); David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968).
74. 457 A.2d at 715.
75. Id at 714. See Cole v. National Cash Credit Assoc., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 49, 156 A.2d 183, 184
(Del. Ch. 1931) (providing a basis for the five exceptions created by the Weinberger court when
courts will not limit minority shareholders to the appraisal remedy). In Cole, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court discussed the concepts of actual and constructive fraud in the context of an injunction
against a merger. To prove constructive fraud in the alleged undervaluation of shares, the dissent-
ing shareholder must show that the valuation constitutes a conscious abuse of discretion, breach of
trust, or mal-administration manifestly causing injury to the dissenting shareholder. Mere inade-
quacy of price does not equal fraud unless the undervaluation suggests bad faith or reckless indif-
ference to the rights of the minority shareholder. Id at 55, 156 A.2d at 188.
76. See Manning, supra note 23, at 230 ("the general tendency in the corporate field is to
center within management all significant operational control and to relegate the shareholder's
claim of 'ownership' to the status of the fungible dollar claim"); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
41 Del. Ch. 7, 9-10, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (1962) (appraisal statute generally is sole remedy for recovery
of fair value of stock sold pursuant to a merger absent fraud or illegality); David J. Greene & Co.
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971) (short form merger statutes constitute
constructive notice of elimination of stockholders' property interest in stock).
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ing to the price offered or invoking the appraisal remedy.77 In this re-
gard, however, the procedural requirements and financial costs of the
appraisal statute impose a substantial hardship on minority share-
holder plaintiffs.78
IV. FAIR DEALING UNDER WEINBERGER
Under Weinberger, courts will judge squeeze-out mergers solely
under the entire fairness test.79 This test, developed in Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corporation,80 involves two basic aspects: fair dealing
and fair price.8' Fair dealing "embraces questions of when the transac-
tion was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockhold-
ers were obtained. '8 2 The Weinberger court concluded that, because
the minority stockholder vote was not informed, the merger failed to
satisfy the element of fair dealing.83
77. 457 A.2d at 715.
78. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (1 & 2) (1982) (requiring dissenting shareholder to
file a written objection containing a formal demand for fair value and setting limited time periods
to challenge the price offered). The Weinbergercourt recognized that the procedural requirements
of the appraisal statute applied to the expanded appraisal remedy. 457 A.2d at 714 n.8. The court
granted plaintiffs a "quasi-appraisal" remedy by allowing them to challenge the element of fair
value. In addition, the Weinberger court extended the availability of this "quasi-appraisal" rem-
edy to the following lawsuits: (1) any case now pending on appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court; (2) any case now pending in the Court of Chancery that has not yet been appealed but
which may be eligible for direct appeal to the supreme court; (3) any case challenging a cash-out
merger, the effective date of which is on or before February 1, 1983; and (4) any proposed merger
to be presented at a shareholders' meeting, the notification of which notifies the stockholders on or
before February 23, 1983. Id at 714-15.
With respect to the financial costs of appraisal, one commentator has opined that "the costs of
appraisal are placed improperly on all shareholders, rather than on those who presumably benefit
most from the merger-the shareholders of the acquiring corporation." Note, Achieving Fairness
in Corporate Cash Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, 16 CONN. L. REv. 95, 117 (1983). See also Re-
cent Development, Corporations-Mergers-Delaware Redfnes "Entire Fairness" Test for Cash.
Out Mergers and Suggests More Liberal Appraisal Remedy, 28 VILL. L. REv. 1049, 1080 n.141
(1983) (procedural structures and limits on attorneys' fees constrain the use of appraisal statutes).
79. 457 A.2d at 712.
80. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
81. 457 A.2d at 711.
82. Id See Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 525, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit.- 8, § 262(h) (1982). See generally Moore, The "Interested" Director or Officer
Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 674, 676 (1979); Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of
Merger Terms Under Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44, 46-47 (1977).
83. 457 A.2d at 703. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered such factors as the
duty of candor, the initiation of the merger by the parent company, the time constraints imposed
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A. Presence of Independent Negotiating Committee
The procedure the corporation uses to effect the merger constitutes
an important aspect of fair dealing. The Weinberger court indicated
that in the future a majority stockholder could structure a merger to
provide insulation from a rigorous fairness review. In a footnote, the
Weinberger court asserted that "the result here could have been entirely
different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee
of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length."84 The exist-
ence of such a committee, particularly in the parent-subsidiary context,
is "strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness."85
Thus, to help withstand challenges to mergers on "fair dealing"
grounds, the subsidiary corporation should appoint an independent ne-
gotiating team composed of disinterested directors 6 to conduct arm's-
length negotiations with the parent corporation. The committee should
hire outside counsel with no previous affiliation with either corporation
or with the investment banking firm responsible for the valuation. The
investment banking firm also should not have any previous association
with either corporation.87 The committee, with the assistance of coun-
sel and the investment banker, should scrutinize all material factors
that affect the determination of a beneficial price for the minority
by Signal, the lack of real negotiations, and the nondisclosure of critical information to the minor-
ity shareholders. Id at 711-12.
84. Id at 710 n.7.
85. According to the court: "Since fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a
theoretical, wholly independent, board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is unfor-
tunate that this course apparently was neither considered nor pursued." Id
86. A disinterested director may be defined as one who exercises independent judgment on
behalf of the corporation and its shareholders. A showing that a director has a conflict of interest,
is under the control of another, or is acting under some other disability should preclude a finding
that the director is disinterested. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1979);
Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,086, at 91,911
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (DeL 1981); M. STEINBERG, CORPO-
RATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 22, at 190-91; Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 21, at 289-90.
87. Bul see supra note 60. To help ensure that the minority shareholders' interests are para-
mount in this context, it is important that counsel and the investment banker have no prior ties or
substantial contacts with either corporation. By using unaffiliated counsel and investment bank-
ing services, the corporation lessens the risk of structural bias. Analogously, the SEC has required
a corporation that has violated pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements in connection with
a transaction designed to eliminate the minority to appoint a "Special Review Person," who has
no prior affiliation with the company and who is acceptable to the Commission, to negotiate on
behalf of the interests of the minority shareholders. See, eg., In re Spartek Inc., [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. ReP. (CCH) 1 81,961, at 81,407; In re Woods Corp., SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 15337, SEC Docket 16-166 (November 16, 1978).
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shareholders. This examination should include such elements as prior
earnings, asset value, future profitability potential, premium over mar-
ket price offered in similar transactions, and the value derived by the
parent from complete ownership of the subsidiary.88 Moreover, be-
cause the parent as a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to
the subsidiary and its minority shareholders, 9 the parent should be
under a duty to disclose all material information in its possession, with
the possible exception of an internal feasibility or similar study,90 that
would be relevant to the negotiating team's evaluation. By receiving
such information and undertaking an independent assessment, the sub-
sidiary will bargain with the parent in a meaningful manner.
If the subsidiary corporation uses the independent negotiating com-
mittee in the manner described above, a court may presume that the
merger was fair and decline to conduct an independent fairness review.
Under Delaware corporate law, the elements of control and domina-
tion or self-dealing must exist in order to invoke the intrinsic fairness
test.91 Therefore, provided that no party stands on both sides of the
transaction or that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a disabling conflict
of interest, it may be argued that a court should not subject the merger
to an entire fairness review.92 The appointment of an independent ne-
gotiating committee to conduct arm's-length, equal bargaining with the
parent corporation allows a court to presume the fairness of the
transaction.93
88. Cf Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
89. See supra cases cited in notes 30-32 & 35-40.
90. A persuasive argument can be set forth that the majority shareholder, although owing
fiduciary duties to the subsidiary and its minority shareholders, has a legitimate interest in further-
ing its own objectives by paying a bargain price for the subsidiary's outstanding stock. An inter-
nal feasibility study helps the parent make this assessment. Disclosure of the study (where the
parent does not stand on both sides of the transaction) to the independent negotiating committee
will provide reason to believe that the parent will pay at least the amount mentioned in the study.
The result may well be the termination by parent corporations in undertaking such studies or a
lowering of the price that would otherwise be stated in such studies. Cf Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
91. Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 152 (D. Del. 1975). See
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del. 1971); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33
Del. Ch. 293, 315, 93 A.2d 107, 117 (1952); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971).
92. See, e.g, Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970); Warshaw v.
Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492 (Del. 1966); Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 487, 121 A.2d 919,
925 (1956).
93. See Sterling v. Maygower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 299, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952);
Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), a i'd, 256 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); David
J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968).
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Authority exists, however, which requires that courts independently
scrutinize the decisions of disinterested directors.94 Although these
cases concern the use of special litigation committees to terminate a
shareholder's derivative suit, they arguably apply to the use of in-
dependent negotiating committees to satisfy the requirement of fairness
in a parent-subsidiary merger. A court's application of its own "in-
dependent business judgment"95 follows from certain "structural
94. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981). In Burks, the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a quorum of four statutorily
disinterested directors within the meaning of the Investment Company Act could terminate a
shareholder's derivative suit brought against fellow directors for violations of the Investment
Company and Investment Advisors Acts. The court formulated a two-part test: (1) whether the
applicable state law permits the disinterested directors to terminate a shareholder's derivative suit,
and (2) whether such a state rule is consistent with the policies underlying the federal securities
laws. 441 U.S. at 480, 486. If, however, dismissal is sought in state court, the only inquiry is
whether state law authorizes dismissal. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 789; see
also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
A number of federal courts applying Burk.? first prong have held that dismissal is proper under
the applicable state law. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1145 (1982) (California law); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 809 (1980) (California law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (Delaware law); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (Delaware law); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Michigan law); Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(Delaware law).
Subsequently, two federal courts precluded dismissal under the applicable state law. See Abella
v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F.
Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Delaware law). See also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Connecticut law); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(Iowa law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd, Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See generally M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 22, at 133-62; M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 22, § 14.01.
95. The Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981),
stated that "when stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack the
board's decision as improper, the board's decision falls under the 'business judgment' rule and will
be respected if the requirements of the rule are met." Id at 784 n. 10. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Colonial Sec. Corp. v. Allen, No. 6778, slip op. (Del. Ch. 18, 1983) (class
action suit was derivative on behalf of the corporation and dismissed because plaintiff failed to
fulfill the demand requirement or demonstrate the futility of such a demand).
Commentators have distilled the Zapata court's holding in demand-refusal cases as follows:
[A] two-step test should be employed in the chancery court's exercise of "independent
discretion" in determining whether to grant dismissal. First, with the corporation bear-
ing the burden of proof, the court should inquire into the special litigation committee's
independence and good faith and the bases supporting its conclusions. Second, provid-
ing that the first step is satisfied, the court should apply "its own independent business
judgment" and "should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law
and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests."
M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 22, at 150.
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bias[es]" and conflicts of interest that are inherent in certain significant
decisions made by the board of directors.
96
Courts should apply this scrutiny to bargaining between a manage-
ment-appointed negotiating committee and the parent corporation. Al-
though negotiating directors do not pass judgment on fellow directors,
as in the special litigation committee context, they are designated to
serve both as directors and as committee members by the interested
majority directors. In such a situation, inherent structural biases
arise.97 In transactions such as freeze-out mergers, which involve high
financial stakes to the majority, a judicial inquiry that ends with a find-
ing that the committee is "disinterested" is not a "sufficient safeguard
against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse."98 The courts should,
therefore, continue to apply their own independent judgment to deter-
minations of whether a merger transaction meets the test of fairness.
To encourage the use of such committees, which appear beneficial to
minority shareholder interests, the burden of proof generally should
shift to the complainants to show that the merger transaction was
unfair.9 9
Thus, in evaluating special negotiating committees, the Delaware
96. "Structural bias" may be defined as "inherent prejudice against [potential shareholder]
action resulting from the composition and character of the board of directors." Note, The Business
Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601 n.14 (1980).
Recognizing the problem of structural bias, the Fifth Circuit held that because of conflicts of
interest, a corporation's board of directors was incompetent to settle the plaintiff shareholders'
derivative claims. Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
For further commentary on this subject, see M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 22, at 133-62; M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 22, § 14.01; see also
Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legisla-
tive Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1981); DeMott, Defending the Quiet Lfe: The Role of Special
Counsel in Director Terminations of Derivative Suits, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 850, 853-54 (1981);
Dent, he Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative
SuitZ 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96 (1980); Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Termi-
nate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment
Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600 (1980); Brodsky, Terminating
Derivative Suits Under Business Judgment Rule, N.Y.L.J. p. 1, col. 1 (May 20, 1981).
97. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
98. Id
99. This rationale is consistent with the approach adopted in Weinberger "where the corpo-
rate action has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders."
457 A.2d at 703, 707-08. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 4 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144(a)(1) (1982); Fliegler y. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); Schlensky v. South Parkway
Bldg. Corp., 19 111. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 792 (1960); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.,
109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952); see also infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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courts should adopt a modified version of the two-step test formulated
in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado."° First, the court should examine the
independence of the negotiating committee, its good faith, and the ade-
quacy of the information it possessed. To encourage the use of these
independent negotiating committees, the minority should bear the bur-
den of proof regarding the issues of good faith and independence. 1 '
The court, however, should place the burden on the majority to show
fulfillment of its duty of full and fair disclosure. Such an allocation is
appropriate because the committee cannot negotiate meaningfully un-
less it receives all material information within the majority's control
that affects price.'02 With respect to the second step, the court, once
again with the minority bearing the burden of proof, should indepen-
dently scrutinize the fairness of the merger. 10
3
Hence, because negotiating committees, unlike special litigation
committees, are designed to protect the minority's bona fide interests,
courts should encourage them. Yet, because of the potential of struc-
tural bias, courts should not give the determinations of these commit-
tees conclusive effect. The standard proposed above reconciles these
competing interests in a compatible framework.
B. Use of Majority of Minority Vote
The merger between UOP and Signal involved the use of another
structural device designed to support the fairness of the merger terms,
namely, shareholder approval by a majority of the minority vote."° If
a subsidiary corporation utilizes this voting structure and fully and
100. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See supra note 95.
101. The court should afford the plaintiff adequate, but not vexatious, discovery. See Prickett
& Hanrahan, Weinberger v. UOP: Delaware's Effort to Preserve a Level Playing Fieldfor Cash-
Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 59, 73 (1983) ("[t]he only practical way to determine whether
there has been full disclosure is to allow the plaintiff reasonable discovery to support his nondis-
closure allegations and determine whether or not other germane facts were withheld").
102. Seesupranotes 86-93 and accompanying text. An exception arguably should be made for
internal feasibility and similar studies and data compiled by the parent. See supra note 90.
103. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
104. 457 A.2d at 703, 707-08. The Weinberger court had no occasion to resolve the question
whether approval by a majority of the minority vote should be based on all outstanding minority
shares or only all such shares actually voting. See id at 708. Arguably, the court implied that a
majority of all outstanding minority shares is the appropriate standard. "At the meeting only 56%,
or 3,208,652, of the minority shares were voted. Of these, 2,953,812, or 51.9% of the total minority,
voted for the merger, and 254,840 voted against it." Id See Prickett & Hanrahan, supra note 101,
at 65-66.
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fairly discloses all material facts, 0 5 the court will shift the burden of
proof to the minority to prove the unfairness of the merger. 0 6 Unless
the minority shareholder vote is an informed one, however, such a vot-
ing structure will be given no effect. 107
An informed vote requiring a majority of the minority approval may
present the majority with an unnecessary risk. One disadvantage arises
if the necessary minority approval is barely obtained 10 8 and the minor-
ity registers a substantial number of dissents. In this event, a court may
closely scrutinize the adequacy of disclosure and the fairness of the
terms underlying the merger. 19 Although such a voting structure nor-
105. SeeWeinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1981). Weinbergerreaffirmed that
the majority owes the minority a duty of candor. In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278
(Del. 1977) (Lynch 1), the Delaware Supreme Court stated that, the Chancery Court should
examine what information defendants had and... measure it against what they gave to
the minority stockholders, in a context in which 'complete candor' is required. In other
words, the limited function of the Court was to determine whether defendants had dis-
closed all information in their possession germane to the transaction in issue. And by
'germane' we mean, for present purposes, information such as a reasonable shareholder
would consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock.
• . . Completeness, not adequacy, is both the norm and the mandate under present
circumstances.
Id at 281.
A duty of candor prevents insiders from using their special knowledge to their advantage and
consequently to the detriment of minority shareholders. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 80, 190 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1972). In
Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 5827 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1983), the Delaware Chancery
Court indicated that the defendants must bear the burden of showing a complete disclosure of all
facts relevant to the transaction. This includes, in the court's view, a showing that the majority of
minority vote was an informed one.
106. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979). See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem.
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 91 A.2d 57 (1952); Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262,
92 A.2d 311 (1952); Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952); see also Infra
note 115.
107. Initially, the plaintiffs must bear the burden of demonstrating a basis for invoking the
fairness obligation. 457 A.2d at 703. Moreover, a corporation cannot render a merger totally
immune from attack merely by structuring the merger agreement so as to require that a majority
of the minority shareholders approve the merger. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333,
1346-47 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Fisher v. United Technologies Corp., 6
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 380, 387 (1981) (unreported decision of Delaware Chancery Court); Cahall
v.Lofland, 114 A. 224 (Del. Ch. 1921). If the minority vote is based on a misleading or incomplete
disclosure, shareholder ratification is meaningless. 457 A.2d at 712.
108. Seeinfranote 153 and accompanying text. Section 251(c) of title 8 of the Delaware Code
mandates that the shareholders approve a subject transaction with a majority of shares entitled to
vote and the majority of each class entitled to vote. If the transaction is structured so as to require
a majority of all minority shares outstanding and a sufficient number of the minority shares arc
not voted, the corporation will not obtain the requisite number for approval. See supra note 104.
109. See Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2
Number 3] NEW LAW OF SQUEEZE-OUT MERGERS
mally shifts the burden of proof to the minority, a hotly contested vote,
in practical effect, may instead impose upon the majority a heavier bur-
den to establish fairness. Hence, the majority should only use the ma-
jority of the minority voting technique when it expects an
overwhelming majority of the minority to approve the transaction. In
that situation, such a voting structure will provide a presumption that
the merger was fair.
C. Relation of Procedural Safeguards to Substantive Fairness
Despite procedural safeguards such as the independent negotiating
committee and the super-majority vote, the substantive requirement of
fair dealing has uncertain application. These indicia of procedural fair
play may not actually serve to promote substantive fairness. 10 More-
over, the Weinberger court stated that "in a non-fraudulent transaction,
we recognize that price may be the preponderant consideration out-
weighing other features of the merger.""' Weinberger thus appears to
hold that a majority shareholder can freeze out the minority for the
sole purpose of eliminating such shareholders if that result is accom-
plished with full disclosure," 12 procedural safeguards," 3 and without
Singer, 39 Bus. LAW. 1, 13 (1983) (material nondisclosures, e.g., company prospects, merger's
purpose, and postmerger plans, could cause shareholder approval of a merger).
110. See Federal Securities and Corporate Developments, 15 SEC. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) 1908
(1983) (remarks of former SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth). Longstreth feels that the myriad
of procedures used "to deflect legal challenges from minority shareholders," in management
buyouts, such as investment banker fairness opinions, nonmanagement director approval and un-
affiliated shareholder ratification, are "inadequate to give shareholders full value for their shares."
d at 1909; see also Federal Securities and Corporate Developments, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
641 (1984) (Longstreth calls for reform in leverage buyouts). For Longstreth's comments on fair-
ness opinions by investment bankers and on SEC rule 13e-3, see infra notes 252-53 and accompa-
nying text.
11I. 457 A.2d at 711. However, the court in Weinberger did not overrule Singer in its entirety.
In addition, the court cited the "entire fairness" standard from Sterling quite extensively. Ird at
715. See also Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 150-51 (Del. 1980) (Quillen, J., concur-
ring); Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.: Ascertaining "Fair Value" Under the Delaware
Appraisal Statute, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 435-36 (1981).
112. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. A materially false or misleading disclo-
sure in connection with a merger may constitute deception within the meaning of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and rule lOb-5. Hence, minority shareholders can,
in certain cases, maintain a federal suit in order to recover damages resulting from such a merger.
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2nd Cir. 1977), ceri. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
113. See Payson & Inskip, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Its Practical Signifcance in the Planning
and Defense of Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CoRr. L. 83, 90 (1983) ("As a practical matter, the
parent's burden of showing the fairness of the transaction will decrease in direct proportion to the
number of safeguards employed in structuring the transaction.").
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self-dealing or other disabling conflict.' 14
Nonetheless, under Weinberger the majority still owes the minority a
fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty of fair dealing forbids the majority
from using the corporate machinery solely or primarily to perpetuate
its own control."t5 For example, in Bennett v. Bruell Petrol Corp., 6 a
dominant shareholder caused the issuance of new shares allegedly to
impair the interests of and ultimately force out the minority sharehold-
ers. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
reasoning that a substantial factual dispute existed regarding the legal
propriety of the motives of the corporate defendant and its controlling
shareholders.1 7 Drawing upon such precedent, it may be argued that
the minority can challenge a freeze-out merger that is solely or primar-
ily completed to consolidate the majority's control, irrespective of the
fairness of the price offered to the minority."'
Moreover, the majority cannot manipulate the corporate voting ma-
chinery for its own control. Even compliance with the statutory merger
formalities' ' does not insulate a merger from judicial review under the
114. See 457 A.2d at 710-11; David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 33
(DeL Ch. 1971).
115. See457 A.2d at 710 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255,267,5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939)). In Singer, the court responded to the argument that the
right to take is co-extensive with the power to take and that a dissenting shareholder has
no legally protected rights in his shares, his certificate or his company beyond a right to
be paid fair value when the majority is ready to do this [by stating that] such an argu-
ment does not square with the duty stated so eloquently and so forcefully. . . in Guhll v.
Loff, Inc.
380 A.2d at 977-78. See also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3rd Cir. 1980); Coleman v.
Taub, 487 F. Supp. 118 (D. Del. 1980), rev'd, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981); Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1965); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962). However,
"[where the majority shareholder refrains from exercising its powers to control or bring about
corporate action (i.e., by conditioning a merger on the approval of a majority of the minority
shares), it arguably should not be required to bear the Sterling.Singer burden of demonstrating the
fairness of the transaction to the minority." Payson & Inskip, supra note 113, at 91. See also
Prickett & Hanrahan, supra note 101, at 64.
116. 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953).
117. Id at 12, 99 A.2d at 239.
118. Similarly, in Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967), the court
stated that "shares may not be issued for an improper purpose such as a takeover of voting control
from others." Id at 775. Condec involved an action to cancel a stock issue allegedly designed to
retain control The court in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 439 (Del. 1971), applied the
same rationale as Bennett and Condec to nullify the advancement of the date of a corporation's
annual meeting. The plaintiffs alleged that the purpose of the change was the perpetuation of
management's tenure in office.
119. See, ag., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Replacement Vol. 1983) (long-form merger stat-
ute); id § 253 (short-form merger statute).
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entire fairness test. 2 ' Thus, if the majority of a corporation accom-
plished a merger solely to eliminate the minority, even with full disclo-
sure and a fair price, arguably a court may still find it inherently unfair
in certain instances.' 21
There are major difficulties, however, with the thesis that the motiva-
tion behind the merger is important after Weinberger. In Tanzer v.
International General Industries,22 which courts should view in light of
Weinberger, the court stated that the majority shareholder has a right to
vote its shares in its own interest for any motive so long as the purpose
underlying the transaction is bona fide. More fundamentally, the criti-
cisms underlying Singers business purpose requirement apply with
equal force in this context. 23  The corporation and its controlling
shareholders, with the benefit of expert advice rendered by counsel and
investment bankers, can readily manufacture an economic justification
for a squeeze-out merger. Thus, in practical effect, it can become al-
most impossible to prove that the majority shareholders acted solely to
perpetuate and advance their control.'24 Because of this and other
problems with Singer,25 the Weinberger court concluded that the busi-
120. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952) (cited
with approval in 457 A.2d at 710, 715). See also 380 A.2d at 977 (defendants, absent justification,
do not meet their fiduciary duty by relegating minority to appraisal proceedings).
121. Consider, for example, the two-tier merger situation when the bidder makes a tender
offer at a certain price to gain a control position in the target corporation, followed by an an-
nounced second-step buyout of the remaining minority shares at a lower price. See infra notes
155-74 and accompanying text.
122. 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Del. 1979).
123. See, e.g., Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A ProposedAnalsis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
487 (1976), Solomon, Going Private Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards, and
Proposalsfor Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975); Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, What Consti-
tutes a Valid Purposefor a Merger, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 852 (1978); Note, Rule 13e-3 and the Going
Private Dilemma: The SEC's Questfor a Substantive Fairness Doctrine, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 883
(1980); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975); Comment, Protection of Minority Sharehold-
ers from Freeze-Outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976).
124. The corporation and its controlling shareholders can practically always proffer ajustifica-
tion for a merger. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) cert.
deied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (elimination of shareholders who are no longer employees); Grimes v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jennette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), a id, 521 F.2d 812 (5th
Cir. 1975) (elimination of conflicts of interest); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977) (long term trust debt financing); Tescher v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d
452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1924), appeal dimirssed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975) (operating efficiency); Matteson
v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) (en banc) (danger of financial collapse).
125. The lower court decision in Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1342-43, 1348-50, "clearly circum-
scribed the thrust and effect of Singer." 457 A.2d at 715. The Delaware Supreme Court contin-
ued: "This has led to the thoroughly sound observation that the business purpose test 'may be ...
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ness purpose test offered shareholders no additional meaningful protec-
tion.1 26  Therefore, after Weinberger, courts will not require the
majority to show that a purpose existed other than that of forcing the
minority's removal. To hold otherwise would raise the very proof cha-
rade that the Weinberger court sought to repudiate. 127
V. "FAIR VALUE" UNDER THE APPRAISAL STATUTE
After Weinberger, the Delaware courts will normally limit minority
shareholders to the monetary value of their stock. 128 Therefore, the
determination of fair price is crucial. The Weinberger standard re-
quires that the court determine fair value by considering all relevant
factors, including elements of future value that are susceptible to proof
but excluding the speculative effects of the merger.'2 9 The court de-
virtually interpreted out of existence, as it was in Weinberger."' Id, (quoting, Weiss, supra note
37, at 671 n.300).
126. 457 A.2d at 715.
127. Thus, the Weinberger court's language as well as policy considerations apparently mili-
tate against such an approach. This conclusion is supported by a subsequent decision in a diver-
sity case in the Southern District of New York. Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., No. 74 Civ.
3915 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1983), af'd, 742 F.2d 1434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 296 (1984).
The merger between defendant's wholly-owned subsidiary and Kirby Lumber Co. also resulted
in a federal securities law claim. See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). In Green, the plaintiffs brought a suit
against the majority for breach of fiduciary duty. They challenged a section 253 short-form
merger under Delaware law on the grounds that the merger advanced no corporate purpose and
that the stock was undervalued. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the basis of Weinberger. Moreover, the court declined to award the plaintiffs the retroactive
relief under the quasi-appraisal remedy provided for by the court in Weinberger. The court lim-
ited this quasi-appraisal remedy to assist only those plaintiffs challenging mergers, which occurred
between the 1977 Singer decision and the 1983 Weinberger decision, who "abjured an appraisal"
in reliance on the Singer rationale.
Significantly, the court indicated that the purpose behind the short-form merger was to give the
parent corporation a method of eliminating the minority. The court noted that to maintain a suit
based on a breach of fiduciary duty, the facts must support an allegation of constructive fraud.
When the fair value of the shares is significantly greater than the total amount offered, or when
the present corporation is depriving the minority shareholders of their rights or otherwise taking
advantage of them, then an action for constructive fraud may exist. If subsequent courts adopt
such an application of Weinberger, the concept of "fair dealing" may offer little substantive pro-
tection to minority shareholders in a going private transaction except in the most egregious cases.
128. 457 A.2d at 711.
129. Id at 713. See also DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Replacement Vol. 1983). Compare
the approach adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger with that of the fairly recent
New York appraisal statute. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 623 (Consol. 1983). Under the New York
statute, the appraisal court determines fair value by considering the following factors:
The nature of the transaction giving rise to the shareholder's right to receive payment for
shares and its effects on the corporation and its shareholders, the concepts and methods
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2
Number 31 NEW LAW OF SQUEEZE-OUT MERGERS
rived the "all relevant factors" standard from language contained in
Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye. 30 Thus, the focus of determining value
is on the intrinsic value of the minority's shares as a proportionate in-
terest in a going concern.' 31
Significantly, the Weinberger court advocated an approach to valua-
tion that allows "proof of value by any techniques or methods which
are generally considered applicable in the financial community."' 132
This broad language arguably permits the court to determine fair value
then customary in the relevant securities and financial markets for determining fair value
of shares of a corporation engaging in a similar transaction under comparable circum-
stances and all other relevant factors.
Id § 623(h)(4). Significantly, the statute eliminates previous statutory language that excluded
from the assessment of fair value any appreciation or depreciation arising from the merger. Id
Also, in determining fair value, a court may take into account "third-party sale value," namely,
"the price the acquired company's shareholders would have received had the company been sold,
as a whole, to another unaffiliated purchaser." Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The
Application of Federal and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA.
L REv. 389, 419-20 (1982). For discussion of the California and English frameworks, see Weiss,
supra note 37, at 682-90.
130. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (1950).
131. The Weinberger court quoted at length from its decision in Tri-Continental:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled
to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. By value of the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate
enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the
merger. In determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser
and the courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably
might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning
prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or which
could be ascertained as of the date of merger and which throw any light on future pros-
pects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to any inquiry as to the value of
the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency fixing the
value.
Id at 526, 74 A.2d at 72, quoted in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1981). Note
that although the court decided Tri-Continentalin 1950, a Delaware court had not construed the
quoted language as such until Weinberger. See Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers
The Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 1, 47 (1983) ("While earlier Dela-
ware decisions have interpreted Tri-Continemnal Corp. as requiring that value be determined by
averaging 'market value, asset value, dividends, [and] earnings prospects,' Weinberger emphasizes
that it is /lutureprospect? which 'must be considered' ").
Significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Chancellor's perception "that the
approach to valuation [in this breach of fiduciary duty case] was the same as that in an appraisal
proceeding." 457 A.2d at 712. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1359-60 (Del. Ch.
1981). For an article discussing the Chancery Court's opinion in Weinberger, see Robinson, Elimi-
nation of Minorily Stockholders, 61 N.C.L. REv. 515 (1983).
132. 457 A.2d at 713. See also Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 151 (Quillen, J.,
concurring) ("In my judgment, counsel and the courts, through the flexibility implicit in the tradi-
tional standard, should encourage the legislatively established valuation process to be open to
generally accepted techniques of evaluation used in other areas of business and law.").
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by estimating what an independent third party would pay for the
shares in an arm's-length transaction. 33 Therefore, it is unclear
whether the Delaware Supreme Court still adheres to its decision in
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,' which applied a going concern standard
that does not encompass valuation based on a hypothetical arms-length
transaction. 135  In any event, the court in Weinberger adopted an ex-
panded appraisal remedy and rejected the traditional "Delaware
block" method as the exclusive formula. 136
133. See Weiss, supra note 131, at 44-49.
134. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). In Bell, the minority shareholders
contended that an appraisal court should assess value on the basis of the per share value of stock
as negotiated in a "hypothetical, third-party arms-length transaction in order to meet Singel's
standard of entire fairness." Id at 140. The court rejected this argument and applied the tradi-
tional "going concern" standard, which is based mainly on earnings, market and asset value. Id
at 142-43. Specifically, the Weinberger court seemed to follow the concurring opinion by Justice
Quillen in Bell, id at 150-51 (Quillen, J., concurring), which stated that "within a statutory ap-
praisal context, the 'entire fairness' and 'careful scrutiny' doctrines are applicable." Id at 150.
See 457 A.2d at 712.
135. Compare the New York approach, supra note 129, with the Bell court's going concern
valuation standard. See Weiss, supra note 131, at 45-58 (valuation under Weinberger requires the
majority to pay the minority at least as much as a third-party would pay in an arm's length
transaction). For commentary discussing the hypothetical valuation standard, see Chazen, Fair-
ness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale
Value" the Appropriate StandardZ 36 Bus. LAW. 1439 (1981); Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some
Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485 (1983); Weiss, The Law of
Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARwozo L. REv. 245 (1983).
See infra notes 135-74 and accompanying text. See also Multitex Corp. v. Dickinson, 683 F.2d
1325, 1328 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("fair value" determined by the price a willing buyer and seller would
agree on if both had adequate knowledge of all the facts).
136. 457 A.2d at 712-13. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright, No. 5827 slip. op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 21,
1983). The Delaware block or weighted average method of valuation, which the Weinberger court
rejected as the exclusive method of valuation in appraisal proceedings, assigns a particular weight
to the elements of value. 457 A.2d at 713. The Tri-Continentaldecision had been subsequently
construed "to require that value be determined by averaging 'market value, asset value, dividends
[and] earning prospects."' W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
1457 (5th ed. 1980), quoted in Weiss, supra note 13 1, at 252. See supra note 133. For a critique of
the Delaware block method of valuation, see Brudney, Efficient Markets andFair Values in Parent-
Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63 (1978); Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighing Asset Value and
Earnings Value in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S.C.L. REv. 1331 (1982). See also Francis I.
Dupont Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973), a f'd 334 A.2d 216 (Del.
1975); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Jacques Coe &
Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368,75 A.2d 244 (Del. Ch. 1950); In re Gen. Realty &
Utils. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (1947); Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch.
1934). See also Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. 1983) (Tennessee
adopts Delaware block rule construing Weinberger narrowly to apply only in cases involving the
rights of minority shareholders in cash-out mergers between a corporation in which such share-
holders had stock and its majority owner).
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A. Elements of Future Value
In determining fair value, the Weinberger court stated that a court
should consider elements of future value if known or susceptible of
proof as of the date of the merger. 137 According to the court, "all rele-
vant factors" can include, within the court's discretion, rescissory dam-
ages if they are susceptible to proof and appropriate.
Generally, a rescissory damages award allows the plaintiff to recover
the value of the stock at the time of resale or at the time of judgment13 8
and does not limit the plaintiff to the stock's value at the time of the
merger. 139 In Weinberger, however, the court, overruling its decision in
Lynch II, held that the Chancellor was not required to award rescissory
damages. 4 ° The Chancellor now has the discretion to apply an out-of-
137. These other types of future value include future earnings, future dividend policies, and
the general future prospects of the company. As construed in Weinberger, courts should only
exclude future value based on "proforma data and projections of a speculative variety relating to
the completion of a merger." 457 A.2d at 713.
138. In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) (Lynch I), the court ordered
"damages which are the monetary equivalent to rescission and which will, in effect, equal the
increment in value that [the defendant] enjoyed as a result of acquiring and holding the [minority]
stock in issue." Id at 501. See 12A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS §§ 5596, 5598 (perm. ed. 1984).
In Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), the Eighth
Circuit held that if a violation of rule lOb-5 is shown in connection with a sale of securities, section
29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act "declares the sale void." Id at 742. The court of appeals
concluded: "If the contract was void as a matter of law, the plaintiff was entitled to restitution of
what he sold, or since restoration of the stock was here impossible, an equivalent money judg-
ment." Id See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 885 (1959). See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979);
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 A fiable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. RE. 1 (1979).
139. The Lynch 11 court's determination of the amount of rescissory damages fixed a mini-
mum price or floor value based on "the amount that [the majority shareholder] had authorized to
be paid to third parties for open market [pre-merger] purchases of [the company's] stock." Lynch
IL 429 A.2d at 505. The court reasoned that "given the fiduciary relationship, the arm's length
bargaining employed in the purchases should not have resulted in the minority stockholders re-
ceiving less than [the majority shareholder] was ready to pay strangers for the same stock." Id
This use of a "prior purchase price" valuation rule allowed the plaintiffs in Lynch 11 to recover,
when by traditional appraisal standards, the minority shareholders may not have been entitled to
damages because the price paid was more than the actual value of a share at the time of the
merger. See Mirvis, supra note 135.
140. 457 A.2d at 714. Therefore, a court should award the minority the increment in value
that the majority enjoyed through acquiring and holding the minority shares exclusive of the
speculative effects of the merger itself.
Ordinarily, when a plaintiffhas two inconsistent remedies available to redress a single right, he
must select one of those remedies. Once the plaintiff makes a choice of remedy, the other inconsis-
tent remedy is precluded. For example, when the plaintiff has been induced to act by fraud, the
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pocket appraisal measure, which is the difference between the actual
value of the stock and the price paid, as well as rescissory damages in
appropriate cases. 141 Therefore, the Chancellor may elect to value the
stock as of the date of the-merger or as of some future date, depending
on the circumstances. In practical effect, the Weinberger court with-
drew the mandatory damages formula, which directly benefited plain-
tiffs, and substituted a discretionary award that may not provide
comparable protection to plaintiffs.
When the procedure utilized to accomplish the merger is suspect, al-
though not fraudulent, courts should choose some future date, such as
the time of judgment, as a basis for valuation. This method would re-
sult in an award of rescissory damages. 142 Although price may be the
plaintiff must choose between a suit for damages or one for rescission and restitution. See Hine,
Election of Remedies: A Criticism, 26 HARV. L. Rav. 707 (1913); Patterson, Improvements in the
Law of Restitution, 4 CORNELL L.Q. 667 (1955); Note, Election of Remedies: A Delusion?, 38
COLuM. L. REv. 292 (1938).
141. The majority in Lynch 11 limited the Chancellor solely to a rescissory measure of dam-
ages. Lynch II, 429 A.2d at 501. But see Harmon v. Masoneilion Int'l, Inc., 422 A.2d 487, 500,
n.23 (Del. 1982). However, the Lynch II court declined to overrule Poole v. N.V. Deli. Maat-
schappij, 224 A.2d 260 (Del. 1966), which applied the out-of-pocket theory in a misrepresentation
case and measured the actual value by appraisal standards. The Lynch II court merely distin-
guished between the breach of fiduciary duty case before it and the misrepresentation presented in
Poole. Lynch II, 429 A.2d at 501. See also Mirvis, supra note 135, at 499 n.73. Weinberger over-
ruled Lynch II presumably because under Wenbergets appraisal approach, a court may award
the out-of-pocket measure and/or a rescissory measure of damages. 457 A.2d at 714. The Chan-
cellor may award rescissory damages "if the Chancellor considers them susceptible of proof and a
remedy appropriate to all the issues of fairness before him." Id Subsequently, in a divorce case,
the Chancellor awarded the husband ownership of the stock in question, but concluded that the
wife must be given the "fair value" of her interest as that term is used in Weinberger. The court
chose to value the stock as of the date of the property division trial as opposed to the date of
divorce. It, thereby, awarded the equivalent of rescissory damages to the wife, on the basis of
certain equitable factors present. Walter W.B. v. Elizabeth P.B., 462 A.2d 414 (Del. Ch. 1983).
142. Some authorities distinguish between the measure of recovery when the plaintiff seeks to
rescind for an innocent misrepresentation and that available for an intentional fraud. When the
misrepresentation is deliberate, the plaintiff is allowed to recover the defendant's profits--through
the constructive trust theory--even though those profits may exceed any losses suffered by the
plaintiff. When the misrepresentation is innocent, however, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the
"direct product" of his property. The plaintiff can recover increments such as dividends or inter-
est resulting without independent action by the defendant, but he cannot recover increments de-
rived from the exercise of the defendant's skill, efforts, or opportunities. See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION §§ 151, 202, 205 (1937). But see Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). In Myzel, the defendants argued that a constructive trust was not
permissible in cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act. The court apparently rejected that
contention, stating that "nondisclosure is the evil proscribed, not the motive that induced it." Id
at 747.
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"preponderant" factor in nonfraudulent merger transactions,14 3
through the award of rescissory damages, the procedural aspect of en-
tire fairness can afford minority shareholders some meaningful protec-
tion. Moreover, the Weinberger court expressly authorized rescissory
damages in cases involving fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, de-
liberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreach-
ing.'" Therefore, in such instances, the Chancellor should allow
minority shareholders to recover the "going concern" value of their
shares together with any increment in value enjoyed by the majority
shareholder exclusive of the speculative effects of the merger.
B. Availability of Equitable Relief
Consistent with prior Delaware law, the court in Weinberger pro-
vided that only in highly unusual circumstances will a stockholder suc-
cessfully obtain a rescission of the merger.'45 Ordinarily, a court
should not award injunctive relief when the plaintiff is challenging only
the fairness of the cash-out price of a merger.1 46 Even if the plaintiff
could demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits of
a claim of unfair price, the appraisal remedy is normally the exclusive
remedy. 47 After Weinberger, the plaintiff must prove actual or con-
structive fraud before a court will issue such an injunction. 148 Hence,
143. 457 A.2d at 711. See supra note 110.
144. 457 A.2d at 714. In delineating these exceptions, the court left open the possibility of a
suit for breach of fiduciary duty. See infra notes 175-92 and accompanying text.
145. 457 A.2d at 741. At common law, a single shareholder had the right to block a merger.
See Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 n. I (Del. Ch. 1969), aft'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970).
Under modem law, however, statutes such as DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 & 253 (Replacement
Vol. 1983) specifically provide for mergers. These statutes generally require only that a majority
of the shares entitled to vote approve the merger. See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL COR-
PORATION LAW 331-32 (1972).
146. The court in Weinberger stated that "in a non-fraudulent transaction we recognize that
price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the merger." 457 A.2d
at 711. When there is a gross disparity between the price offered by the majority and fair value, a
court should find gross and palpable overreaching, and sufficient grounds for injunctive relief.
147. When the dispute is only over value, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that the
appraisal remedy adequately protects the shareholders' interest in obtaining fair value for their
shares. 457 A.2d at 715. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del.
1962); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); see also Berger
& Allingham, supra note 109, at 10-11.
148. In Cole v. National Cash Credit Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (Del. Ch. 1931), the
court formulated the test for obtaining an injunction of a merger. The court required the share-
holder to prove actual or constructive fraud in connection with the merger in order to enjoin it.
The plaintiff can prove constructive fraud in the alleged undervaluation of the shares, when the
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only when the court finds one of the Weinberger exceptions to apply
will it grant an injunction against a merger. 149
The Weinberger court's holding is consistent with its prior decisions
in Singer, Tanzer and Najjar to the extent that it allows a minority
shareholder to bring a suit to enjoin the merger if fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, self-dealing, or deliberate waste has occurred. Significantly, how-
ever, unlike the Singer era, when such suits frequently withstood
motions to dismiss, 5 0 after Weinberger, the lack of a proper business
purpose will not support an injunction against a merger.'5 ' Weinberger
thus imposes a higher standard for obtaining injunctive relief against
the consummation of a merger.
A court should award an injunction, however, if the majority fails to
disclose information that relates to the fairness of the merger price that
induced the minority shareholders to forego the election of their ap-
valuation constitutes a conscious abuse of discretion, or when a breach of trust or maladministra-
tion manifestly injures the dissenting shareholder. Mere inadequacy of price does not amount to
fraud unless the undervaluation suggests bad faith or reckless indifference to the rights of the
minority shareholder. id at 54, 15 A. at 187-88. Cole provided the basis for the Weinberger
court's listed exceptions and established the proposition that shareholders have the option to ac-
cept the terms of the merger or to seek a valuation of the shares in appraisal.
In David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971), the Delaware
Chancery Court indicated that it would rarely grant an injunction unless the fair value of the stock
was so much greater than the amount offered, the minority shareholders were otherwise deprived
of clear rights or so taken advantage of by those charged with a fiduciary duty that the court could
imply constructive fraud. Otherwise, the parties are merely disputing value for which appraisal is
an adequate remedy. The court further stated that it would not issue a preliminary injunction
unless the moving party established a reasonable probability of ultimate success at the final hear-
ing. Finally, the court would not issue an injunction simply because it may not cause any harm
pending the final hearing. Id at 33.
149. Therefore, when a court finds fraud or illegality or egregious overreaching, it can award
injunctive relief. In addition, cases involving deliberate or ongoing waste of corporate assets pres-
ent a proper situation for injunctive relief because the surviving corporation may be unable to
satisfy appraisal awards. A court may enjoin self-dealing transactions if the parent fails to dis-
close the benefits it derived from the merger. See 457 A.2d at 714. In the post-merger period,
injunctions may never be available. See In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 524, 412 A.2d
1099 (1980).
150. See, e.g., Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
151. Weinberger is a partial return to the rationale of pre-Singer law in Delaware where courts
rarely granted injunctions against the consummation of mergers. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus.,
Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch.
1968); Stryker & Brown v. Bon Ami Co., C.A. No. 1945, reprinted in 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 157 (1977)
(Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 1964); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Del.
Ch. 1943); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940); Cole v. Na-
tional Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2
Number 3] NEW LAW OF SQUEEZE-OUT MERGERS
praisal rights.'52 In addition, a court should make an injunction avail-
able to protect minority rights that originate in the terms of the merger
agreement. For example, a majority of the minority voting provision
requires the approval of this group of shareholders as a condition pre-
cedent to the effectiveness of the merger. In that case, the nondisclo-
sure or misstatement of any fact that influenced the shareholders'
decision on the merger should satisfy the irreparable injury standard. 53
Thus, the majority's failure to adhere to the disclosure obligations im-
posed by Weinberges concept of fair dealing may give rise to injunc-
tive relief. 54
152. If the failure to deal fairly encourages the shareholders not to perfect their appraisal
rights, the shareholders should be able to demonstrate irreparable injury. Such misrepresentations
are specifically listed in Weinberger as an instance when a court may not consider appraisal an
adequate remedy. 457 A.2d at 714. One source contends that the other elements of fair dealing
enumerated in Weinberger, id at 711, covering the timing, the initiation, the structure, the negotia-
tions, the disclosure to the directors, and the method of approval of the directors of the transaction
are unlikely to "mislead minority shareholders into giving up their appraisal rights, as long as the
facts with respect to such matters are fully disclosed." Berger & Allingham, supra note 109 at 12.
Hence, they argue that Weinberger does not impose an obligation on the majority to time, initiate,
structure, or negotiate the deal fairly as long as the minority is fully apprised of that information
when making a decision to seek or forego appraisal rights. Id at 12-14.
153. Appraisal should be deemed an inadequate remedy in this context. Nondisclosure of any
fact that a reasonable shareholder considers material to his decision on how to vote on the merger
should lead a court to find that the vote was uninformed and provide a basis for awarding injunc-
tive relief. Arguably, therefore, a voting structure based on majority of minority approval presents
unnecessary risks to the majority. It imposes a disclosure obligation broader than the disclosure
requirements normally present in a freeze-out merger that often cover the fairness of the price
offered. See Berger & Allingham, supra note 109, at 13, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
154. It is arguable that, unlike Singer era injunctions, which tended to be of a more permanent
character, injunctive relief granted after Weinberger may be temporary in nature and accompa-
nied by an order merely mandating additional disclosure. This approach is premised on the ra-
uonale that the lack of a proper business purpose as the basis for injunctive relief in the Singer era,
in all practicality, brought merger plans to a halt for prolonged periods of time. Because Wein-
berger has eliminated the business purpose test, injunctions will now be largely premised on the
lack of adequate disclosure, which can be readily cured by supplemental disclosure and the pas-
sage of a sufficient time period to permit shareholders to digest the additional information. None-
theless, it is possible that in egregious cases courts will conclude that mere supplemental disclosure
is insufficient to protect shareholder interests, and order more extensive relief. Cf. Hanna Mining
Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742
(N.D. Ohio) (extensive relief ordered to remedy violations of section 13(d) of the Exchange Act).
In Joseph v. Shell Oil Company, 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 1984), the court preliminarily enjoined
a tender offer for the minority shares of the Shell Oil Corporation because the defendants stood on
both sides of the transaction and violated a fiduciary duty to the minority by failing to make
adequate disclosure. Initially, the case arose from the decision of the Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company to acquire all of the minority shares in its 69.5 percent subsidiary, the Shell Oil Com-
pany, in a merger for $55 cash per share based on the opinion of its investment banker, Morgan
Stanley. The Shell board, a majority of which were outside directors, appointed a special commit-
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C. Two-Tier Offers
The typical two-tier control transaction raises some interesting valu-
ation concerns in the appraisal context. In a two-tier control transac-
tion the bidder first makes a partial tender offer to secure a controlling
position in the target company. Later, the controlling shareholder, ini-
tiates a merger to freeze out the minority at a lower price per share.'55
tee made up exclusively of outside directors to evaluate the proposal. The committee rejected the
$55 merger price based on a fairness opinion rendered by Goldman Sachs, another investment
banker, that valued the stock at $80-$85 per share. Royal Dutch subsequently withdrew its
merger proposal and instead commenced a tender offer for Shell at $58 per share. In order to
induce the shareholders to tender their shares, Royal Dutch also announced that it would not
propose a tender offer or merger transaction at a price higher than $58 for at least eighteen
months.
The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that the defendants, who stood on both sides of the
transaction, owed a fiduciary duty to the minority that it breached by not making adequate disclo-
sures to the minority. The court found such lack of adequate disclosure because Royal Dutch
failed to inform Shell's minority shareholders that it declined to supply essential information for
Morgan Stanley to arrive at a fair opinion as to value. The chancery court stated: "It defies
reason to argue that an oil exploration company such as Shell could be valued without any in-
depth inquiry into the estimated value of the probable oil reserves." Royal Dutch also failed to
disclose to Shell minority shareholders that members of Shell management made a "going con-
cern" evaluation of the company's stock at $91 per share. Finally, Royal Dutch violated the duty
of fair dealing as set forth in Weinbergerby not disclosing to Shell minority shareholders that "the
initial valuation opinion of Morgan Stanley was arrived at after only eight days of inquiry .... "
It has been argued that the court's reliance on the nondisclosure aspects of the transaction was
misplaced. Before the tender offer's commencement, the conclusion by Shell's special committee
that a price of less than $75 was unfair had been discussed and widely publicized in the SEC
Schedule 14D-9 distributed by Shell to all its shareholders. In addition, the Royal Dutch offering
circular arguably disclosed the important facts to the shareholders. Moreover, it appears Royal
Dutch, as the majority stockholder, did not have substantial access to inside information on Shell.
Royal Dutch, the Shell board of directors, and the Shell special committee all had access to the
same information and the minority shareholders were well informed as to the differences of opin-
ion on value. See Herzel & Finkelstein, Fairness, Majority, Minority, Nat'l L.J., July 16, 1984, at
15-19 col. 3.
The chancery court, however, recognized the fundamental distinction between a freeze-out
merger and a tender offer initiated by the majority shareholder. In a tender offer, unlike a freeze-
out merger, the shareholder makes his own decision on whether to tender or keep his shares. The
court indicated, however, that an exception to the rule that a majority stockholder does not have a
fiduciary obligation to offer a fair price in a tender offer exists "when the maker of the tender offer,
who has a fiduciary duty to the offeree, structures the offer in such a way as to result in an unfair
price being offered and the disclosures are not likely to call the unwary stockholder's attention to
the unfairness." On the basis of the material nondisclosures made by Royal Dutch, the court
enjoined the tender offer until curative disclosure was made.
155. For a discussion of appraisal and "entire fairness" valuation issues in the two-tier con-
text, see Mirvis, supra note 135; Schlagman, Determining a Fair Price in Two-Step Takeovers of
Asset-Rich Firms, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 1, 1982, at 4, col. 1. Note that under Weinberger, the court's
approach to valuation generally remains the same whether in the context of an appraisal or a
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The first-step tender offer price in this setting reflects a premium that
the acquiror will pay to gain control.1 56 The price offered in the second
step of such a transaction nonetheless should be suspect unless a major-
ity of the disinterested shareholders approve the lower price or eco-
nomic justifications support the price.157 Absent these circumstances, a
court should classify both steps in a two-tier control transaction as
components of a single transaction.15 8 Hence, a court should deem the
price paid in the tender offer "fair value" unless intervening events jus-
tify the second-tier or other appropriate price.
Due to the coercive nature of the forced second step, tender offerors
historically have pressed shareholders to tender their shares quickly or
risk oversubscription of the initial offer and a subsequent freeze-out at
a lower price. 159 In response to this problem, Congress adopted section
breach of fiduciary duty. 457 A.2d at 712. In either case, the court will apply the fairness test. Id
at 715.
156. Courts have recognized that a purchaser is often willing to pay a premium over market
price in order to take control of the corporation. See Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d
460, 464 (Del. Ch. 1975); Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 60, 65, 158 A.2d 797,
799 (1960); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 565, 123 A.2d 121, 124 (1956);
see also In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (1965); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 310, 93 A.2d 107, 116 (1952).
157. Propositions set forth with respect to two-tier offers are not necessarily premised on the
"entire fairness" rationale as articulated in Weinberger and prior cases. In terms of invoking fidu-
ciary duty principles, courts arguably should distinguish second-step mergers initiated to gain
complete ownership shortly after a successful partial tender offer from combinations of long-held
business affiliates.
In the latter case there has been a long-term relationship between the two firms, with one
managing or controlling the other, and the fiduciary relationship is especially important
because it has developed over time; the minority has in fact relied on the majority and
maintains an expectation of fairness. Contrarily, the second step of a unitary plan to
acquire a target cannot be viewed as a transaction between related parties, and thus no
fiduciary duty should be recognized. At the announcement of a two-step tender offer,
the bidding corporation is an unrelated outsider-it is in an adversarial relationship to
the shareholders of the target corporation. The only duty it owes at this point is to its
own shareholders to acquire the target as cheaply as possible. It would be anomalous to
hold that at the completion of the first-step tender, and prior to the second-step merger,
the acquiring corporation suddenly owes a fiduciary duty to its former adversaries at the
expense of its own shareholders.
Comment, supra note 129, at 415. See also Brudney & Chirelstein, .4 Restatement of Corporate
Freeze-outs, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1360-61 (1978).
158. See Mirvis, supra note 135, at 489; Comment, supra note 129, at 416.
159. Some commentators contend that the inherently coercive nature of two-tier pricing de-
prives the target shareholder of the ability "to make an informed, independent judgment on
whether [the average of the tiers] is an acceptable overall price for the assets of the firm." Brudney
& Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 337 (1974).
See also Bradley, lnterfrm Tender Offers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345
(1980); Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations,
Washington University Open Scholarship
386 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:351
14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act160 and the SEC revised rule
14d-8.161 These changes in federal law force the offeror to establish a
proration pool and to accept on a pro rata basis all shares tendered
throughout the duration of the offer.' 62 Nevertheless, the minority
shareholder remains at a disadvantage in comparison to large institu-
tional investors because the short time periods do not afford an unso-
phisticated shareholder adequate time either to consider the merits of
the offer or to obtain sufficient information upon which to base an in-
formed investment decision. 163 Moreover, courts thus far have rejected
71 CALIF. L. REv. 1072 (1983); Brudney & Chirelstein, supranote 157, at 1440-41, 1471-74; Easter-
brook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 722-28 (1982).
160. Section 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders, for less than
all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater number of securities
is deposited pursuant thereto within ten days after copies of the offer or request of invita-
tion are first published or sent or given to security holders than such person is bound or
willing to take up and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may
be pro rata, disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by
each depositor. The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to securities deposited
within ten days after notice of an increase in the consideration offered to security hold-
ers, as described in paragraph (7), is first published or sent or given to security holders.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
161. See Exchange Act Release No. 19336, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 83,306 (1982) [hereinafter Pro Rate Rule]. Rule 14d-8 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the pro rata provisions of section 14(d)(6) of the Act, if any person
makes a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, for less than all of the outstand-
ing equity securities of a class, and if a greater number of securities are deposited pursu-
ant thereto than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the securities
taken up and paid for shall be taken up and paid for as nearly as may be pro rata,
disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each depositor
during the period such offer, request or invitation remains open.
17 C.F.R. § 250.14d-8 (1983). The rule's validity has been questioned. See generally Lederman &
Vlahakis, Pricing and Proration in Tender Offers, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 813, 815-19 (1981); Note,
Rulemaking Under Section 14(e) of the ExchangeAct: 7he SEC Exceeds Its Reach in Attempting to
Pullthe Plug on Multiple Proration Pools, 36 VAND. L. Rav. 1313, 1327-30 (1983); Comment, supra
note 129, at 409-13; Green & Nathan, The SEC'S New Prorationing Rule Will Change "Partial"
Tender Offers, Nat'l L.J. Jan. 10, 1983, at 38, col. I.
162. Under section 14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act, the proration period is ten days from the
date of the offer. Whereas, the SEC Proration Rule "effectively extends the proration period for
partial tender offers to twenty days .... Because Rule 14e-l provides that a tender offer must
remain open for at least twenty days, rule 14d-8's extension of the pro rata period to the life of the
tender offer effectively doubles the minimum statutory proration period of ten days that section
14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act established." Note, supra note 16, at 1315, 1318. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-I (1983); see also Proposed Pro Rata Tender Offer Rule, Exchange Act Release No.
18761, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,222, at 85,141 n.2 (May 25, 1982).
163. When the SEC adopted an extended proration period, it recognized the shareholder's
need for sufficient time and information to make an investment decision and sought to minimize
the confusion created by changing proration periods and multiple proration pools. See Pro Rata
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shareholder challenges that have attempted to characterize the price
paid in a second step forced merger as "manipulative" in violation of
section 14(e) of the Williams Act. 64
A number of states have responded to the problems created by two-
tier offers by adopting "equal price" provisions. 165  These provisions
generally require that, absent sufficiently disinterested shareholder ap-
proval, the bidder must pay the same price in the second-step forced
transaction as it paid in the first step.166 For example, the Pennsylvania
"antitakeover" legislation allows forced second-step transactions only
if a majority of the disinterested directors or shareholders of the subject
corporation approve or if the same price is paid in the second-step
transaction as was paid in the first-step tender offer. 1 67 The Maryland
Rule, supra note 161, at 85,651. Institutional investors such as commercial banks, pension funds,
and investment companies are a dominant force on stock exchanges. See supra note 159.
164. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Radol
v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982). For other commentary on the Commission's
activities under the Williams Act, see Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game:
The Securities and Exchange Commirsion's ProposedAmendm ents to the Williams Act, 17 HARv. J.
ON LEGIs. 409 (1980); Jupiter, An Analysis ofEfforts to Avoid Williams Act Requirements, 9 SEC.
REG. L.J. 259 (1981); Manges, SEC Regulation ofIssuer and Third-Party Tender Offers, 8 SEC.
REG. L.J. 275 (1981); Thigpen, Cash Offers, Capital Market Discipline, and the 1968 Legislation
Revisited, 49 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1981); Note, Expansion ofthe Williams Act: Tender Offer Regula-
tionfor Non-ConventionalPurchas, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 277 (1980); Note, Problems in the Regu-
lation of Tender Offers: The Williams Act, State Takeover Statutes, and SEC Rules, 13 TULSA L.J.
552 (1978); Symposium, The FederalScheme ofTender Offer Regulation, 7 J. CORP. L. 525 (1982).
Note that SEC rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1984), adopted in Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 16075 (1979), normally applies to second-step freeze-out transactions. Generally, rule
13e-3 prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative acts or practices in connection with going
private transactions. It also prescribes filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements to pre-
vent such acts or practices. Significantly, the SEC exempts second-step transactions, such as merg-
ers, from the rule if they occur within one year of the first-step tender offer and the tender offeror
pays the same price in the "clean-up" transaction as it paid in the tender offer. See A. BORDEN,
GOING PRIVATE (1982); infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
165. See Smith, And-Takeover Measures in 1984 Seen Matching or Exceeding Last Year's Pace,
Wall St. J., March 30, 1984, at 10, col. 2. Anti-takeover statutes present constitutional concerns.
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Illinois takeover statute imposed impermissible
burden upon interstate commerce); see also Bloomenthal, The New Tender Offer Regimen, State
Regulation, and Preemption, 30 EMORY L.J. 35 (1981); Humphrey, State Tender Offer Statutes, 61
N.C.L. REv. 554 (1983); Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Polit-
ical Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover
Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689 (1981).
166. See, e.g., MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-202, 3-601-03, 8-301(12)-(14) (1982);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.831 (Page 1978); S. 1144, Act 92 (1983) (amending Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 408, 409.1, 910 (Purdon).
167. The Pennsylvania statute reaches fundamental second step transactions, such as mergers
or sales of substantially all assets, which frequently follow a hostile tender offer for a bare majority
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statute provides that the second-step forced transaction must be at the
same price as the first-step tender offer unless a super majority of the
shareholders approve the second step.1 68
Although equal price provisions protect minority shareholder inter-
ests, these provisions are not without costs. Undoubtedly, they will
have a chilling effect on the initiation of adverse corporate takeovers.
Equal price provisions increase the cost of such hostile acquisitions be-
cause they require the offeror to purchase all the shares at the higher
first-step price. 169 The higher cost of purchasing an entire company
may lead hostile bidders to conclude that certain offers, which they
otherwise might contemplate, are not feasible. Hence, because "equal
price" provisions discourage free market activity, they may ultimately
harm shareholder interests as a whole and impair market efficiency.' 70
The requirement that tender offerors pay the same price in both steps
of a two-tier transaction may thus decrease the frequency of certain
beneficial tender offers. Other more meritorious interests, however,
outweigh this concern. By enabling an offeror to gain control by means
of a partial tender offer at one price, yet subsequently freeze out minor-
ity shareholders at a substantially inferior price, this coercive tactic ele-
vates control over equal opportunity for and fair treatment of minority
shareholders. 17 1 Moreover, if a court does not use the tender offer price
of the target's shares. See Steinberg, State Law Developments-The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover
Legislation, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 184 (1984).
168. MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1982). The Maryland statute specifically
provides that eighty percent of the eligible votes must approve any such business combination and
that two-thirds of the eligible votes, other than voting stock held by the interested stockholder who
is a party to the business combination, must approve the transaction. Id Similarly, the Ohio
statute requires approval by a majority of the voting power excluding the votes of any interested
shares. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1978). See generally Kreider, Fortress Without
Foundation? Ohio Takeover.Act 1, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 108 (1983); Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers
and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Lfgislation, 43 MD. L. REv. 266 (1984); Wolff, The Unconstitu-
tionality of the Arkansas Tender Offer Statute, 36 ARK. L. REv. 233 (1983).
169. Steinberg, supra note 167, at 188.
170. See Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellants, and Takeout Mergers: The
CaseAgainst Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RSEARCH J. 341; Toms, Compensating Share-
holders Frozen Out in TYo-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 548 (1978); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 159, at 423-31.
171. See Brudney, supra note 159, at 1118-22. As stated by Professor Brudney:
It has been urged that the costs of a rule of equality in two-step takeover transactions
outweigh its gains. The argument is that a rule of equality would increase the cost of,
and hence discourage some takeovers. To the extent that the principle of equality en-
courages holdouts in response to the tender offer, it will make the takeover less likely to
succeed and more costly. Two undesirable consequences follow. More productive use of
assets by the acquirer is impeded, and the disciplinary effect of the takeover market is
[Vol. 62:351
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/2
Number 3] NEW LAW OF SQUEEZE-OUT MERGERS
as "fair value" in an appraisal case, many shareholders will bypass the
technical, expensive, and cumbersome appraisal proceeding17 2 and sell
their shares at the price fixed in the second-step merger transaction.
In many states, appraisal remains "a remedy of desperation."1 7 3 In-
deed, even large institutional investors acquiesce in two-tier mergers
rather than invoke the complex and uncertain appraisal process, as
demonstrated by U.S. Steel's second-tier merger transaction with Mar-
athon.7 4 Therefore, unless a majority of informed minority sharehold-
ers approve the lower second-tier price or outside factors influence the
value of the stock between the two steps, the fair value of the shares
should remain constant throughout the transaction.
VI. EFFECT OF WEINBERGER ON STATE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY SUITS
Plaintiffs who invoke their appraisal remedy are required to fulfill
unduly onerous procedures in many states. 7 5 Because minority share-
diminished. Moreover, since premiums are always paid on takeovers (in anticipation of
more productive use of assets), to discourage takeovers is to make all public investors in
potential targets poorer.
The opposing argument is that even if takeovers enhance social utility to some dis-
puted extent, the costs of allowing the acquirer to coerce shareholders into yielding their
property are too high. Arguably, the dispersed stockholders are paid less in the takeover
than a single knowledgeable seller would be willing to accept. Since dispersed share-
holders lack the bargaining capacity of a single owner of a majority of the stock, the
bidder's price is likely to be less than the "ideal" market price. To permit the price in the
second step merger of a unitary transaction to be lower than the tender price is to further
reduce the sellers' price option.
Id. at 1119. See authorities cited supra note 159. See also Finkeistein, 4ntitakeover Protection
Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers" The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Tho-
Over Provisions Under Delaware Law, I1 SEc. REG. L.J. 291 (1984).
172. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; infra notes 175, 291-92.
173. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Deci-
sion Making, 57 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 85 (1969).
174. See Comment, supra note 129, at 417 n.160, (quoting Garson & Tyson, Pru Switch on
Marathon, Both Now Favor U.S. Steel Merger, Am. Banker, March 11, 1982, at 10, col. 1.
175. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Replacement Vol. 1983) (shareholder may not
have voted for or consented to merger and must make a written demand for payment before the
shareholder vote); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 157.70 (Smith-Hurd 1983-84 Supp.) (shareholder
must make a written objection before the shareholder's meeting and a written demand within 20
days after the effective date of the merger); see also Garson & Tyson, supra note 174 (stating that
"after studying Ohio's complex appraisal process," the fourth and sixth largest shareholders of
Marathon, Morgan Guaranty Trust and Prudential Insurance Company, elected to acquiesce in
the merger of Marathon with U.S. Steel rather than seek appraisal).
Some commentators have advocated lessening the procedural obstacles associated with the ap-
praisal remedy and broadening the coverage of the appraisal statutes. See Latty, Some Miscella-
neous Novelties in the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw & CoNrEMP. PROS. 363, 390 (1958);
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holders frequently fail to perfect these procedural requirements and,
therefore, lose their right to pursue an appraisal, 176 suits alleging
breach of fiduciary duty may be their only option. Indeed, until the
courts determine the extent of the Weinberger exceptions, the practical
effect of the decision may well be an onslaught of breach of fiduciary
suits.
17 7
In this regard, however, suits for breach of fiduciary duty are more
difficult to bring as a result of Weinberger. Prior to Weinberger, such
suits frequently withstood motions to dismiss.1 78 After Weinberger,
however, dissatisfied minority shareholders must allege that the trans-
action contained specific elements of "fraud, misrepresentation, self-
dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets or gross and palpable over-
reaching" to survive a motion to dismiss. 179 Unless the court finds one
of these exceptions, the minority shareholder cannot challenge the fair-
Comment, Minority Rights and the Corporate "Squeeze" and 'Treeze" 1959 DuKE L.J. 436, 458.
The New York appraisal statute appears to be a significant step toward achievement of this objec-
tive. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623 (McKinney 1982), discussedin Comment, supra note 129, at 418-
19.
Dean O'Neal argues that states should make appraisal available for any corporate transaction
that substantially affects the rights of shareholders in a close corporation by changing the essential
nature of the enterprise; for example, a sale of assets. He suggests that the only condition prece-
dent to a shareholder's assertion of his dissenter's rights should be that the notification is in writ-
ing, and that he elects to have his shares appraised and purchased. F.H. O'NEAL, OPPRESSlON OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, 609-10 (1975).
Like New York, some states have lessened the procedural obstacles to the invocation of an
appraisal remedy. For example, the North Carolina Business Corporation Act requires the corpo-
ration to notify shareholders of their appraisal rights when the corporation asks the shareholders
to vote on certain fundamental changes. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-100(b)(2), 55-108(a), 55-
112(c)(2), 55-118(a)(2) (1982). Similarly, in 1974, New Jersey amended its corporation statute to
require the corporation to outline to the shareholder the appraisal procedure and imposed upon
the corporation an obligation in subsequent communications with shareholders to advise them of
deadlines. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 14A:10-3, 14A:10-11, 14A:l 1-2 (1976). For more state statute noti-
fication procedures, see infra note 292.
176. See 457 A.2d at 714 n.8.
177. See Payson & Inskip, supra note 113, at 94.
178. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
179. The requirement of specific allegations makes it more important that courts afford plain-
tiff minority shareholders adequate discovery. See 457 A.2d at 705 ("[the plaintiff in a suit chal-
lenging a cash-out merger must allege specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of
misconduct to demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority"); Prickett & Han-
rahan, supra note 101, at 71 ("Weinberger shows that even a properly skeptical minority stock-
holder and his counsel may not be prepared in some cases, without the benefit of discovery, to
detail in an original complaint the material facts which the majority stockholder has not
disclosed.").
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ness of the merger through a suit for breach of fiduciary duty. 8 '
Although the Weinberger court did not specifically list nondisclosure
of a material fact as an exception to the prescribed use of the appraisal
remedy, nondisclosure remains a basis for a breach of fiduciary duty
suit. Traditionally, a material nondisclosure or a misleading disclosure
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.' 8 ' Weinberger supports this ar-
gument. There the court held that Signal's failure to disclose the ad-
verse feasibility study to UOP was a breach of the duty of candor that
the majority owed the minority.'82
Traditionally, the fiduciary duty suit made available to the plaintiff a
wider range of relief than an appraisal proceeding. 83 The Weinberger,
court's expansion of the remedies available under the appraisal statute
considerably narrows this advantage. After Weinberger, the relief
available under an appraisal proceeding and a breach of fiduciary duty
suit frequently may be identical. In both proceedings, courts will take
all relevant factors into account, including where appropriate, the
award of rescissory damages. 84 Such an award, however, is within the
180. In David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 33 (Del. Ch. 1971), the
Chancery Court indicated that appraisal is an adequate remedy unless the case involved actual or
constructive fraud. Usually, the parties are actually disputing value, irrespective of what an action
is labeled. Weinberger apparently follows this rationale, holding that appraisal is the sole rem-
edy-unless the merger involves fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corpo-
rate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching.
181. Nondisclosure has provided the basis for a state court injunction of the merger and has
significant implications on the availability of a section 10(b) suit under the Securities Exchange
Act. See Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977); Healey v. Catalyst Recov-
ery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Kidwell ex
rel Penfold v. Meilde, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
182. 457 A.2d at 705, 708-09. The court stated that "a primary issue mandating reversal is the
preparation by two UOP directors of their feasibility study for the exclusive use and benefit of
Signal. This document was of obvious significance to both Signal and UOP." Id at 708. In SEC
v. Senex Corp., 399 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ky. 1975), independent consulting firms prepared several
feasibility reports concerning a bond issue for a municipal project. The promoter withheld the
adverse studies from the agencies interested in the project. Id at 504-05. The court found that
"the adverse report represented a difference of opinion among experts which should have been
disclosed." Id at 505. The nondisclosure of the differing opinions to interested parties constituted
conduct "clearly at odds with the spirit of the disclosure requirements." Id
183. See, eg., Gillerman, The Corporate Fiduciary Under State Law, 3 CORP. L. REv. 299
(1980); Kaplan, supra note 23; Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 478 (1981); Solomon, supra note 123.
184. 457 A.2d at 714. See supra notes 137-44.
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court's discretion and, in practical effect, may be awarded only where
one of the Weinberger exceptions, i.e., a breach of fiduciary duty, is
found.18 Another important distinction between the appraisal pro-
ceeding and the suit for breach of fiduciary duty is that the latter carries
with it the possibility of an injunction against the consummation of the
merger. 186
Thus, the state breach of fiduciary duty suit still offers a minority
stockholder certain advantages. 8 7 Most significantly, the shareholder
who brings a breach of fiduciary duty suit does not have to comply with
the procedural requirements of the appraisal statute. Also, courts are
more likely to award rescissory damages in such an action. Moreover,
an injunction against the merger's consummation remains a viable
remedy in a breach of fiduciary duty suit. Although minority share-
holders may wish to use the breach of fiduciary duty suit for these rea-
sons, unless they specifically allege one of the Weinberger exceptions,
they will be merely challenging the fairness of the price paid. 88 In
such a case, appraisal is the sole remedy and courts will relegate the
185. 457 A.2d at 714. The Weinberger court expressly recognized that even the liberalized
appraisal remedy may not be adequate in a merger involving conduct encompassed by the excep-
tions. Id
186. See supra note 148.
187. Some commentators, however, maintain that appraisal offers a significant advantage.
Shareholders successfully pursuing appraisal will obtain a monetary reward. In a breach of fidu-
ciary duty suit, a court may simply cancel the merger altogether if the majority does not wish to
comply with the court-ordered changes in the terms of the merger. Hence, with an appraisal
proceeding the shareholders retain the benefit of the improved terms. See, e.g., Comment, supra
note 111, at 435.
188. In Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Civ. 5827 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1983) (available Sept. 7,
1984 on Lexis, Del. Corp. Library, DeL Cases File), plaintiffs alleged that a proxy statement was
false and misleading in its omission of material facts and that the omission constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty. The Delaware Chancery Court found that the proxy statement was neither false
nor materially misleading and, therefore, that the minority vote was an informed one. The court
stated that "[in light of the elimination of the business purpose rule and my finding of complete
disclosure, the Plaintiffs are in the precarious position of merely challenging the fairness of the
... price." Id
The court, however, allowed the minority stockholders who did not vote in favor of the merger
and who did not accept any benefit from the merger to challenge the fairness of the price through
an appraisal proceeding without perfecting their appraisal rights. The court reasoned that the
Weinberger court had relaxed the procedural requirements in pending cases that were eligible for
direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.
Although the court's decision may tempt minority shareholders to allege a breach of fiduciary
duty in order to circumvent the procedural requirements of the appraisal statute, the minority
should be cautious. If the minority shareholders cannot support the allegations and, in effect, they
are only challenging the price, the courts will relegate plaintiffs to their statutory remedy. More-
over, if such parties fail to perfect their appraisal rights, they may well lose their right to an
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minority stockholder to the statutory appraisal proceeding with its pro-
cedural prerequisites. 8 9 Moreover, a court will apply the quasi-ap-
praisal remedy, which grants relief to certain plaintiffs who have not
complied with the appraisal statute,190 only in situations, as in Wein-
berger, where the plaintiff has "abjured an appraisal,"' 9'1 presumably in
reliance on the availability of a Singer-type breach of fiduciary duty
suit.' 92
VII. THE DUTY OWED TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS BY AN
INVESTMENT BANKER IN RENDERING A FAIRNESS OPINION
Although the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion did not address the
plaintiff's claims against UOP's investment banker, 193 the widespread
use of fairness opinions prepared by an investment banker to influence
or inform the minority in a tender offer or merger' 94 merits attention.
appraisal. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., No. 74 Civ. 3915, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Stauffer
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962).
189. Assuming that such a complaint for breach of fiduciary duty survives a motion to dismiss,
the settlement value of the action may be greater than that of an appraisal proceeding. Prior to
Weinberger, the lower courts frequently declined to dismiss a minority shareholder suit if the
shareholders sufficiently alleged unfairness or that the only purpose of the merger was to eliminate
them. See Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
190. 457 A.2d at 714.
191. In Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., No. 74, Civ. 3915, (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 742 F.2d 1434
(2d Cir), cert. denied, 105 S. CL 296 (1984) the Southern District of New York refused to allow
plaintiffs to challenge the element of fair value when they had made a tactical decision to forego
an appraisal. At the time the action was instituted, the Delaware Supreme Court had not yet
decided Singer. The court submitted that the quasi-appraisal remedy is only available to assist
those minority shareholders whose actions arose between the 1977 Singer decision and the 1983
Weinberger opinion.
192. The quasi-appraisal remedy enumerated in Weinberger applies only to the following
situations:
(1) this case; (2) any case now pending on appeal to this Court; (3) any case now pend-
ing in the Court of Chancery which has not yet been appealed but which may be eligible
for direct appeal to this Court; (4) any case challenging a cash-out merger, the effective
date of which is on or before February 1, 1983; and (5) any proposed merger to be
presented at a shareholder's meeting, the notification of which is mailed to the stockhold-
ers on or before February 23, 1983.
457 A.2d at 714-15.
Therefore, the Green court stated that "the policy considerations behind the court's decision to
allow certain plaintiffs to continue to seek remedies other than appraisal would not be promoted
by a blind application of the court's provision for retroactive relief. Further, plaintiffs would reap
a windfall that the Delaware Supreme Court could not have intended." Green v. Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc., No. 74, Civ. 3915, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
193. The plaintiffs dismissed Lehman Brothers prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's en
banc decision. 457 A.2d at 703, n.3.
194. One factor contributing to the widespread use of fairness opinions is SEC rule 13e-3,
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Significantly, no judicial authority exists for imposing liability on an
investment banker when rendering a fairness opinion based on negli-
gent misrepresentation or fiduciary duty theories. t 95 However, the mi-
nority shareholder undeniably relies on the opinion of a reputable
investment banking firm in deciding whether to approve the terms of a
merger, to tender shares to a bidder, or to seek an appraisal of the fair
value of the shares.196
A. Investment Banker's Role in Weinberger
In Weinberger, UOP's president hired Lehman Brothers to prepare a
fairness opinion addressing the price the minority should receive for
their shares. 197 UOP chose Lehman Brothers because its long-standing
business relationship with UOP allowed it to act within the severe time
constraints placed on the preparation of the opinion.t9 Initially, a
partner of Lehman Brothers, who had been a director and financial
advisor to UOP, determined that a price of $20 to $21 per share would
be fair.'99 Subsequently, a three-man Lehman Brothers team ex-
amined the relevant documents and information concerning UOP, 200
which contains a number of disclosure requirements for going private transactions. For a further
discussion of rule 13e-3, see supra note 164; infra notes 251-61 and accompanying text.
195. See, eg., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1335, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981); Comment, The
Standard of Care Required of an Investment Banker to Minority Stockholders in a Cashout Merger:
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CoRP. LAW 98 (1983).
196. See, e.g., Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821-22 (D. Del.
1974). See also Comment, supra note 195, at 110-11.
197. 426 A.2d at 1338. See also 457 A.2d at 706.
198. See 457 A.2d at 706; 426 A.2d at 1338. In addition, a partner at Lehman Brothers was a
long-time director of UOP as well as its financial advisor. The UOP President "felt that [this
partner's] familiarity with UOP as a member of its board as well as being a member of Lehman
Brothers would also be of assistance in enabling Lehman Brothers to render an opinion within the
existing time constraints." Id
199. Id A price of $20-21 per share represented almost a 50 per cent premium over UOP's
market price. Id But see 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1908, 1909 (remarks of former SEC
Commissioner Bevis Longstreth) (investment bankers place excessive reliance on market price in
evaluating the value of the shares).
200. 457 A.2d at 706; 426 A.2d at 1339. The information that the team reviewed included
UOP's annual reports and SEC filings for a three-year period, as well as UOP's audited financial
statements for the year preceding the buyout, its interim reports to shareholders, and its recent and
historical market prices and trading volumes. 457 A.2d at 706. The minority shareholders in
Weinberger criticized the qualifications of the three man team and the lack of critical analysis of
the true worth of the minority shares. They asserted that there was no Lehman opinion except the
opinion of the Lehman partner who was a director of UOP. Appellant's Brief at 55, Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 201 (Del. 1983).
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performed a "due diligence" visit at UOP's headquarters, 20 and con-
cluded that $20 or $21 would be a fair price for the remaining shares of
UOP. 20 2
On the morning that both UOP's and Signal's boards met to consider
the proposed merger, the Lehman Brothers partner, as he was flying to
the UOP meeting, looked over the materials prepared by the three-man
team and the two-page "fairness opinion letter" in which the price had
been left blank.2 °3 At some point "[e]ither during or immediately prior
to the directors' meeting, the two-page 'fairness opinion letter' was
typed in final form and the price of $21 per share was inserted."'2° At
the UOP board meeting, Signal's board chairman presented the UOP
directors with financial data including the Lehman Brothers fairness
opinion letter and a brief comment on the information that had gone
into preparing the letter.205 The Board approved the merger 2° and ad-
vised the shareholders in a subsequent proxy statement that Lehman
Brothers had given its opinion that a $21 price per share was fair to the
minority. The letter did not disclose "the hurried method by which this
conclusion was reached. ' '2°
The plaintiff in Weinberger alleged that the preparation of the opin-
ion created a conflict of interest for Lehman Brothers and that Lehman
Brothers had conspired with Signal and Signal-controlled management
to present the opinion as though Lehman Brothers had given a care-
fully considered, impartial opinion on the fairness of the merger
price.20 8 In addition, the plaintiff argued that the failure to disclose the
basis of the fairness opinion and the method utilized in its preparation
201. In the course of the "due diligence" visit, the Lehman team interviewed UOP's president,
its general counsel, its chief financial officer, and other key executives. 457 A.2d at 706.
202. Id at 707. Lehman Brothers had previously advised Signal, the majority shareholder, in
its 1975 tender offer for UOP. At that time, Signal acquired a 50.5 per cent interest in UOP.
During the course of the contested tender offer, Lehman had drawn up a study of the desirability
of acquiring the remaining UOP shares at a price of up to $21 per share. Plaintiff contended that
if $21 was a fair price in 1975 after a particularly poor year, then $21 could not possibly be a fair
price after two subsequent years of vastly improved performance. 426 A.2d at 1347.
203. 457 A.2d at 707.
204, Id
205. Id
206. The five UOP directors who were also directors of Signal abstained from voting, but
indicated that they would have voted in favor of the proposed merger terms. 426 A.2d at 1340.
207. Id at 1341.
208. Id The basis of the conspiracy charge was "that Lehman Brothers was actually working
in the interests of Signal rather than UOP's minority in rendering its fairness opinion," thereby
deceiving the minority shareholders into approving the merger terms. Id at 1347.
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violated the majority's duty of complete candor to the minority.20 9 Fi-
nally, the plaintiffs asserted that when the majority employs an invest-
ment banker to render a fairness opinion and thus "to provide
assurance to minority stockholders that the offer by the majority is
fair," courts should hold the investment banker "to the fiduciary stan-
dards of the majority itself."210 The Delaware Chancery Court entered
judgment in favor of Lehman Brothers.21' The plaintiffs dismissed
their complaint against Lehman Brothers prior to the Delaware
Supreme Court's en banc decision.212
B. Duties Owed by Investment Bankers
The issue remains whether an investment banker rendering a fair-
ness opinion owes any duty to minority stockholders. In the withdrawn
Delaware Supreme Court opinion,21 3 the majority found that the only
basis for imposing a duty on an investment banker arose from the con-
tractual relationship between the parties.21 4 However, the dissent in the
withdrawn Weinberger opinion declared that an investment banker had
a duty to exercise reasonable care.215 Failure to do so, according to the
dissent, should render the investment banker liable under a theory of
negligent misrepresentation to the minority shareholders as foreseeable
third parties.21
6
209. 426 A.2d at 1351. See also Appellant's Brief, supra note 200, at 53, 55. For a discussion
of the requirement of complete candor, see Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del.
1977); supra note 40.
210. Appellant's Brief, supra note 200, at 50.
211. 426 A.2d at 1398, 1353, 1363.
212. 457 A.2d at 703, n.3.
213. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58,1981, (Del. Feb. 9, 1982), withdrawn, 457 A.2d 701, 703,
n.1.
214. Id See Comment, supra note 195, at 105.
215. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58,1981, at 7 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982) (Duffy, J., dissenting),
wthdrawn, 457 A.2d at 703, n.1. For an article discussing the Duffy dissent, see Deutsch, Wein-
berger v. UOP: Analysis of a Dissent, 6 Cos. L. REv. 29 (1983).
216. Id The negligent misrepresentation theory is based on section 522 of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the gui-
dance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited scope of persons for whose benefit and gui-
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The dissent's analysis appears reasonable given the persuasive influ-
ence that a fairness opinion may have on the minority. 1 7 Certainly,
investment bankers know that their fairness opinions will be used by
the majority to induce the minority stockholders to act. 218 Hence, the
minority shareholders constitute a limited class of reasonably foresee-
able third parties to whom the investment banker should owe a duty of
reasonable care.219
An analogy to an accountant's common law liability for negligent
representations to third parties supports the concept that an investment
banker should owe a duty to the minority.2 ° An accountant may be
liable for materially negligent representations made in financial state-
ments, audits, or other work papers z.2 2  Although some courts enforce a
dance he intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends to
supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of
the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976). See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp.
85, 91-92 (D.R.I. 1968). See also Comment, supra note 195, at 106 n.57.
217. See, ag., Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 827 (D. Del. 1974);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58, 1981, at 7 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982) (Duffy, J., dissenting), withdrawn,
457 A.2d at 203, n.7.
218. See Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821 (D. Del. 1974); see
also Comment, supra note 195, at I 11.
219. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58, 1981, at 7 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982) (Duffy, J.,
dissenting), withdrawn, 457 A.2d at 703 n.1; see also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed.
1971); Comment, supra note 195, at 113.
220. For articles discussing accountants' liabilities at common law, see Fiflis, Current Problems
fAccountant's Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 67-87 (1975); Gruenbaum &
Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and Responsibility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13
Lov. L.A.L. REv. 247, 308-312 (1980); Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Ac-
counts, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1959); Kurland, Accountant's Legal Liability: Ultramares to Bar-
chris, 25 Bus. LAw. 155 (1969); Marinelli, The Expanding Scope ofAccountants'Liability to Third
Parties, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 113 (1971); Mess, Accountants andthe Common Law: Liability to
Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1977); Note, Accountants' Liabilitiesfor False and Mis-
leading Financial Statements, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 1437 (1967); Note, Accountants' Liabilty for
Negligence-A Contemporary Approachfor a Modern Profession, 48 FoRDiAm L. REV. 401 (1979).
For cases discussing accountants' liability under the federal securities laws, see, e.g., Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1607 (1980); Herzfeld v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
540 F.2d 27 (2nd Cir. 1976), affginpart, rev'ginpart, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
221. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'don other
grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-93 (D.RLI. 1968);
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strict privity requirement,222 other courts extend the accountant's liabil-
ity to third parties whose reliance is specifically foreseeable.223 A court
may also find an accountant liable for fraud in certain instances.2 24
The services of both accountants and investment bankers are em-
ployed to influence third parties, including minority shareholders, who
rely on their representations.225 Therefore, an investment banker who
makes a materially negligent representation in a fairness opinion
should be held liable to the minority shareholders for whose benefit the
opinion was rendered. 226  Thus, courts normally should hold invest-
ment bankers to the standard of reasonable care recognized in the pro-
Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y.
170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). An accountant's liability for negligence has been held to cover certified
financial statements as well as audits and returns. See Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp.
340 (D. Neb. 1979); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); White v. Guarente, 43
N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315 (1977).
222. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 442 (1931). The rationale for
the privity rule is the fear of creating an unlimited class of potential plaintiffs. Id at 181-85, 174
N.E.2d at 444-48. See also Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th
Cir. 1971); Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor-
wath, 370 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So.
2d 291, 293-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Western Sur. Co. v. Loy, 3 Kan. App. 2d 310, 312, 594
P.2d 257, 260 (1979).
223. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds,
425 U.S. 185 (1976). See also Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner
& Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-93
(D.R.I. 1968); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 128, 248 N.W.2d 291, 301-02 (1976); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v.
Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 381-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d
356, 362-63, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1977); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah
1974); Shatterproof Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
In addition, the New Jersey and Wisconsin Supreme Courts have extended an accountant's
liability to those persons who foreseably might rely on the audit. See Citizens State Bank v.
Timm, Schmidt & Co., S.C., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler, 93 NJ. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
224. See, ag., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 190-91, 174 N.E. 441, 449 (1931)
("negligence or blindness, even when not equivalent to fraud is nonetheless evidence to sustain an
inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence-is gross."); see also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F.
Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1954), aI'd, 285 A.D. 867, 139 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,
278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 220, at 312-13.
225. Compare Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (financial data in SEC
filings relied on by investors) with Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821
(D. DeL 1974) (persuasive impact of investment banker's opinion on stockholders). See also supra
note 217.
226. .4ccordWeinbergerv. UOP, Inc., No. 58,1981, at 7 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982) (Duffy, J., dissent-
ing), withdrawn, 457 A.2d at 703 n.1; Comment, supra note 195, at 113. See also 426 A.2d at 1338.
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fession.22 7 In light of the Weinberger entire fairness standard,228 the
investment banker's fairness opinion, absent exceptional circumstances
such as fraudulent concealment of information by insiders, should ade-
quately disclose and fairly present all material information relevant to
the per share value of the minority's interest in order to discharge the
banker's obligation to exercise reasonable care.229
A problem in the application of this theory to fairness opinions lies
in the lack of concrete standards in the investment banking community.
It appears that, in determining value, the conduct of investment bank-
ers, unlike accountants, is not governed by a set of industry guidelines
other than those general factors that the Weinberger court laid out.
230
Thus, the weight in a given case assigned to such factors as asset, mar-
ket, dividend, and earning values is left largely to the discretion of the
individual investment banker.23' Addressing the valuation techniques
of two reputable investment bankers in one recent case, the Delaware
court referred to the "questionable methodology employed" as well as
the "quick and cursory" analysis used before concluding that "both the
opinions of Morgan Stanley and of Goldman Sachs leave something to
be desired."2 32 Moreover, even when investment bankers use the same
data for arriving at their opinions, they often express different opinions
as to value.23 3
The lack of recognized standards in the investment banking profes-
sion provides an additional reason for not permitting the use of such
fairness opinions to insulate the transaction from an entire fairness re-
view.234 In the fair dealing context, procedural safeguards such as the
227. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (burden of defendant
accountant under § 11 of the Securities Act to show due diligence care as a defense).
228. 457 A.2d at 703-04, 715. The fairness review part of Singer survived the Weinberger
decision.
229. Cf Herzfeld v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976)
(certified financial statement found false and misleading under rule lOb-5; judged by test for the
"fairness" of the financial statement taken as a whole). See generally Gruenbaum & Steinberg,
supra note 220, at 258-64.
230. See 457 A.2d at 712-13.
231. The nature and trends of the particular industry bring another element into the equation.
Cf Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
232. Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 385 (Del. Ch. 1984).
233. Id See also Radol v. Thomas, 584 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Richardson v. White,
Weld & Co., Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,864 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
234. Compliance with professional norms may constitute persuasive evidence of due care
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special negotiating committee and super majority voting requirements
do not guarantee the fairness235 of a transaction. Similarly, the absence
of concrete standards and the ease with which such favorable fairness
opinions are obtained236 dictate that courts should not consider the ren-
dering of such opinions to be an assurance of fairness.
C. Application to Weinberger
In Weinberger, Lehman Brothers arguably failed to satisfy its duty to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances when it rendered the
opinion upon which minority shareholders would foreseeably rely.
237
A reasonably complete presentation is not possible when the invest-
ment banker ffies to the board meeting with a favorable fairness opin-
ion letter in which the "fair" price per share is left blank.238 Moreover,
given the hurried nature of the Lehman Brothers team's conclusions,
under tort law. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). However, courts must
review the standards utilized in the profession and employ fair presentation principles. Cf.
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1113 (7th Cir. 1974), rey'don othergrounds, 425 U.S.
185 (1976) (an accountant's compliance with generally accepted accounting standards (GAAS) is
not a bar to recovery unless court finds that GAAS reflects professional practice constituting rea-
sonable prudence); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1006 (1970) (compliance with generally accepted accounting principles is evidence of reason-
able care, but remains subject to a fairness review). But cf. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d
785, 787-89 (9th Cir. 1979) (accountant's compliance with GAAS held to discharge his obligation).
See generaly Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 220, at 258-63; infra note 232.
235. See supra notes 79-127 and accompanying text.
236. See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six,
4 C~ARozo L. REv. 245, 255 (1983) ("it often is all too easy for a corporation to find a compliant
investment banker prepared to opine, without much study, that a proposed transaction is 'fair and
reasonable' "). Cf. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976) (rejecting the defense of compliance with GAAS and GAAP, and testing the fairness of the
financial statement as a whole). The district court in Herzfeld stated:
Compliance with generally accepted accounting principles is not necessarily sufficient for
an accountant to discharge his public obligation. Fair presentation is the touchstone for
determining the adequacy of disclosure in the financial statements. While adherence to
generally accepted accounting principles is a tool to help achieve that end, it is not neces-
sarily a guarantee of fairness.
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(quoting Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Ob-
servations, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 4 (1973)). See generally Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 220,
at 263. For a discussion of the duty to disclose, see infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
237. See 457 A.2d at 703-08.
238. The corporation selected the investment banker, a Lehman Brothers partner, because of
his personal familiarity with UOP. Further, the corporation represented him to the Board and
shareholders as specially knowledgable. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 200, at 54; supra note
198.
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compliance with acceptable standards is questionable.2 39 Although an
investment banker, especially in view of time limitations imposed by a
client, cannot always conduct a full review, the banker should fully
reveal the extent of his inquiry to those who rely on his findings.240
These observations raise the related issue of whether the banker
should disclose the basis of the fairness opinion to the minority. The
plaintiff in Weinberger contended that the failure to disclose the true
basis of the opinion violated the requirement of complete candor.24' In
Denison Mines Ltd v. Fibreboard Corp.,242 a Delaware federal district
court held that the "bare reference of the Proxy Statement to an opin-
ion of an independent investment banking firm that the transaction was
fair to the company and its stockholders without further reference to
the basis for that opinion was misleading."243 The Delaware Chancery
Court in Weinberger distinguished the Denison case on the grounds that
in the case at bar the proxy statement included a copy of the opinion
239. See infra note 244. The plaintiffs in Weinberger argued that Lehman Brothers did not
actually issue an independent opinion and that the fairness opinion given was entirely that of the
Lehman partner who was also a UOP director. Brief of Appellant, supra note 200, at 53, 55.
Furthermore, plaintiffs contended that Lehman was responsible for the acts of its partner under
agency principles. Id at 49. Cf. InreF.W. Koenecke & Sons, Inc., 605 F.2d 310, 312-13 (7th Cir.
1979) (in a case seeking contract damages, court applied traditional agency law to determine ac-
counting firm's liability for the conduct of one of its partners). See generally Gruenbaum & Stein-
berg, supra note 220, at 276-77.
240. Certainly, an investment banker is under no duty to decline an appointment merely be-
cause of limited time constraints. However, the banker should exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances and fully disclose the limited nature of the review.
241. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. When accountants have reason to foresee
that third parties will rely on their work, courts may impute a duty to disclose to those third
parties. See, e.g., Spectrum Fin. Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
aiec, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); Wessel v. Buhler,
437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971); Medelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069,
1073 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
196,214, at 92, 487 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1977); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F.
Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Gold v. DCL, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
242. 388 F. Supp. 812 (D. Del. 1974).
243. Id at 822. See Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 794
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (the non-disclosure of an investment banker's conflict of interest was highly rele-
vant in assessing the firm's per share price recommendation). See also Richardson v. White &
Co., [1979 Transfer Binders] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,864 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Royal Indus.,
Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binders] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,863
(C.D. Cal. 1976). For a further discussion of conflicts of interest when the investment banker,
acting as a bidder's financial advisor in connection with a tender offer, was the recipient of mate-
rial, nonpublic information concerning the subject company while acting as its financial advisor,
see Steinberg, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contestsfor Corpo-
rate Control, 30 EMORY L.J. 169, 183-84 (1981).
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letter and adequately disclosed the basis of that opinion. In so ruling,
however, the chancery court ignored the cursory nature of Lehman
Brothers' review, which should have been disclosed to UOP
shareholders.' 4
D. Propriety of _Imp ying a Fiduciary Duty
In Weinberger, the plaintiff raised the related issue of whether a court
should hold an investment banker, who had been retained by the sub-
sidiary corporation to evaluate the fairness of the cash-out price, "to
the fiduciary standards of the majority itself. '24- Because the invest-
ment banker's knowledge of the relevant facts and its skill in reviewing
a merger are superior to the average minority stockholder and because
the banker should expect the minority to rely on the fairness opinion, it
may be argued that the investment banker owes a fiduciary duty to the
minority.24
6
No authority exists, however, to support this proposition.247 This
244. See supra note 236. In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court observed that there was
"no disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the rather cursory preparation of the Lehman
Brothers' fairness opinion." 457 A.2d at 710. The court implied, however, that this lack of disclo-
sure was solely Signal's obligation. Id This should not be the law. The corporation used the
fairness opinion of the investment banker with the banker's consent and with the knowledge that
the shareholders would rely upon it. Under these circumstances, the investment banker should be
held responsible for the opinion's contents, including any material nondisclosures. Cf. Dirks v.
SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re The Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963);
Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing Securities Within an Inte-
grated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAMi LAW. 755 (1981).
245. Appellant's Brief, supra note 200, at 50. To find otherwise, "will provide a judicial in-
ducement to investment bankers to give the appearance of working for the minority but actually
to further the interests of the majority (who will continue to control the corporation and provide
additional investment banking business)." Id See also Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor-
wath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168 (Del. 1976). One commentator identified the problem of allowing
the majority, who owes a fiduciary duty to the minority, to delegate part of that duty to an invest-
ment banker when the banker is held to a lower standard of care. The commentator suggests that
such a practice sprves to create an exception to the Sterling rule of strict scrutiny and entire fair-
ness when a party stands on both sides of a transaction. Comment, supra note 195, at 110.
246. See id at 118-19. For cases on fiduciary law principles, see Reynolds v. Wangelin, 322
Ill. App. 13,53 N.E.2d 720 (1944); Koehler v. Hailer, 62 Ind. App. 8, 112 N.E. 527 (1916); Dawson
v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); Williams v. Griffin, 35 Mich. App.
179, 192 N.W.2d 283 (1971); McKinley v. Lynch, 58 W. Va. 44, 51 S.E. 4 (1905).
247. See 426 A.2d at 1348. See also Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1980) (no breach of fiduciary duty by an investment banker who acted upon confidential, non-
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lack of authority should not be viewed as determinative. Although it is
rare for a long-term relationship to develop between the investment
banker and the minority shareholders, the minority places its trust and
confidence in the investment banker's opinion and thus has a reason-
able expectation of fairness.248 Moreover, it is beyond dispute that an
investment banker ordinarily owes a fiduciary duty to its clients. When
an investment banker renders a fairness opinion prepared largely for
the benefit of the minority shareholders, and it is foreseeable that the
minority will rely upon the opinion,2 49 the banker's clientele arguably
encompasses the minority shareholders of the client corporation."'
In any event, a minority shareholder's foreseeable reliance on the
fairness opinion should give rise to a duty of reasonable care by the
investment banker. Liability for breach of this duty should be imposed
under a theory of negligent misrepresentation to third parties. Courts
should require investment bankers to disclose adequately and present
fairly all information relevant to the value of the minority interest
when rendering a fairness opinion. Moreover, if compelling circum-
stances mandate that the banker undertake a less than full review, the
banker should disclose the actual extent of the review conducted and
an explanation of its failure to perform a full review. Courts should
hold a banker to this standard of reasonable care in the preparation of
the fairness opinion to protect the interests of the minority shareholder
adequately.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger not only af-
fects state corporation law but it also has an indirect impact on certain
provisions of the federal securities laws. The following discussion will
address the more pertinent issues.
public information provided by target company in context of previously contemplated tender of-
fer). See generally Steinberg, supra note 243, at 181-84.
248. Cf Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (special relationship creates a duty to disclose or
refrain from trading); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (necessity of special relation-
ship to create fiduciary duty).
249. See426 A.2d at 1338. UOP "retained the services of the defendant Lehman Brothers for
the purpose of rendering an opinion as to the fairness of the price to be paid the minority for their
shares". Id Hence, "[t]he majority's purpose in engaging Lehman Brothers was to safeguard the
interest of the minority while ensuring that it satisfied its own duty." Comment, supra note 195, at
119,
250. See Comment, supra note 195, at 117-19.
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A. SEC Rule 13e-3 and Related Issues
In addition to surviving the Weinberger entire fairness review under
Delaware law, going private transactions must comply with the disclo-
sure requirements of SEC rule 13e-3. 25  Rule 13e-3 requires subject
parties to disclose material facts about a going private transaction. The
mandated disclosure includes whether the parties reasonably believe
that the transaction is fair to shareholders and the factors upon which
they base that belief.252 The rule also obligates subject parties to dis-
close whether they received an outside opinion on the fairness of the
proposed transaction.253 They must furnish a summary of the opinion
and include the basis for and methods employed in reaching the valua-
251. SEC Sec. Exch. Release No. 34-16,075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979). In general, the rule
prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with going private
transactions and prescribes filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements as a means reason-
ably designed to prevent such acts or practices." Id at 46,737. See supra note 164. See also SEC
Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 34-16,112,44 Fed. Reg. 49,406 (1979) (Commission adopted rule 13e-4
to govern an issuer's tender offer for its own securities). In general, rule 13e-4 requires that a
schedule 13E-4 be filed with the SEC, and establishes disclosure, dissemination, and compliance
requirements. Note that an issuer's tender offer, which is regulated by rule 13e-4, is also a going
private transaction subject to rule 13e-3; therefore, it must comply with both rules.
For commentary on rule 13e-3, see, e.g., Cohen, Open Market & Privately Negotiated Purchases
ofStock, INST. ON SEc. REG. 87 (Oct. 10, 1980); Connolly, New Going Private Rule, 13 REV. SEC.
REG. 975 (1980); Manges, SEC Regulation ofIssuer and Third Party Tender Offers, 8 SEc. REG.
LJ. 275, 278 (1981); Rothschild, Going Private, Singer, andRule 13e-3: What Are the Standardsfor
Fiduciaries?, 7 SEC. REo. L.J. 195, 216-22 (1979); Steinberg, The Securities andExchange Commis-
sion's Administrative, Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies-Their Influence on Cor-
porate InternalAffairs, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 173, 198-99 (1982); Note, Regulating Going Private
Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 782 (1980); Note, Rule 13e-3 and the Going
Private Dilemma: The SEC's Questfor a Substantive Fairness Doctrine, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 883
(1980) [hereinafter referred to as Going Private].
252. Rule 13e-3, as finally adopted in 1979, also requires the following: (1) a description of
both the benefits and detriments of the transaction to the issuer as well as affiliated shareholders;
(2) disclosure of any report, opinion, appraisal or negotiation report received from an outside
party relative to the going private transaction; (3) disclosure of any plans by the issuer to merge,
reorganize, sell assets or employ any other material change after the transaction; (4) disclosure of
the source and total amount of funds for the transaction, an estimation of expected expenses, a
summary of any loan agreements and arrangements to finance and repay loans. See SEC Sched-
ule 13e-3(H) Items 5, 6, & 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1984). Initially, the Commission considered
adopting a "fairness" requirement, which would have required any going private transaction to be
both substantively and procedurally fair to minority shareholders. See SEC Sec. Exch. Act Re-
lease No. 14,185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977). Instead, the SEC requires that the subject parties
disclose whether they reasonably believe that the transaction is fair to shareholders and the bases
for such belief. Even as adopted a number of commentators contend that the Commission has
engaged in substantive regulation under rule 13e-3. See, e.g., Note, Going Private, supra note 251,
at 883-84.
253. The rule also requires management to disclose whether nonaffiliated directors approved
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tion. Commentators disagree over whether these rules actually result
in going private transactions that are fairer to minority stockholders." 4
Former SEC Commissioner Longstreth has criticized the widespread
use of the easily obtainable favorable investment banker opinions.2 -5
To prevent abuses in management buyouts, Longstreth suggests that a
majority shareholder who wants to buy out public shareholders should
first afford independent offerors the opportunity to make alternative
bids. The majority, before being permitted to go forward with the
the transaction and whether the corporate charter requires ratification by a majority of the unaffil-
iated shareholders. Schedule 13E-3, Item 9 provides:
(a) State whether or not the issuer or affiliate has received any report, opinion (other
than an opinion of counsel) or appraisal from an outside party which is materially re-
lated to the Rule 13e-3 transaction including, but not limited to, any such report, opinion
or appraisal relating to the consideration or the fairness of the consideration to be offered
to security holders of the class of securities which is the subject of the Rule 13e-3 transac-
tion or the fairness of such transaction to the issuer or affiliate or to security holders who
are not affiliates.
(b) With respect to any report, opinion or appraisal described in Item 9(a) or with
respect to any negotiation or report described in Item 8(d) concerning the terms of the
Rule 13e-3 transaction:
(1) Identify such outside party and/or unaffiliated representative;
(2) Briefly describe the qualifications of such outside party and/or unaffiliated repre-
sentative;
(3) Describe the method of selection of such outside party and/or unaffiliated repre-
sentative;
(4) Describe any material relationship between (i) the outside party, its affiliates,
and/or unaffiliated representative, and (ii) the issuer or its affiliates, which existed during
the past two years or is mutually understood to be contemplated and any compensation
received or to be received as a result of such relationship;
(5) If such report, opinion or appraisal relates to the fairness of the consideration,
state whether the issuer or affiliate determined the amount of consideration to be paid or
whether the outside party recommended the amount of consideration to be paid.
(6) Furnish a summary concerning such negotiation report, opinion or appraisal
which shall include, but not be limited to, the procedures followed; the findings and
recommendations; the bases for and methods of arriving at such findings and recommen-
dations; instructions received from the issuer or affiliate; and any limitation imposed by
the issuer or affiliate on the scope of the investigation.
Instrucioff The information called for by subitem 9(b)(1), (2) and (3) should be
given with respect to the firm which provides the report, opinion, or appraisal rather
than the employees of such firm who prepared it.
(c) Furnish a statement to the effect that such report, opinion or appraisal shall be
made available for inspection and copying at the principal executive offices of the issuer
or affiliate during its regular business hours by any interested equity security holder of
the issuer or his representative who has been so designated in writing. This statement
may also provide that a copy of such report, opinion or appraisal will be transmitted by
the issuer or affiliate to any interested equity security holder of the issuer or his represen-
tative who has been so designated in writing upon written request and at the expense of
the requesting security holder.
254. See articles cited supra note 251.
255. See 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 641 (1984); 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1908
(1983). See also supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
406 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
transaction, should then be required to match or top a higher third-
party offer.25 6 This alternative theoretically presents no risk to man-
agement with a controlling interest because the independent third-
party offeror has no chance of making a successful tender offer for a
majority of the outstanding shares.257 In practice, however, the con-
trolling shareholder's failure to match the highest price offered may
invite lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty258 or induce the minority to
seek appraisal. In an appraisal proceeding, the price offered by a bona
fide offeror would be relevant in determining "fair value. 259
Under the present framework, moreover, few independent parties
would thoroughly evaluate a company without a reasonable chance of
successful purchase, except for the investment banker selected by man-
agement to render a fairness opinion. Generally, the minority interest
cannot afford to hire its own investment banker. Therefore, to help
effectuate the intent of the independent evaluation alternative, the
outside directors of the subsidiary corporation should retain an invest-
ment banker who has no previous contacts with the parent or subsidi-
ary corporation or with either corporation's management. Through the
use of the fairness opinion relied on by minority shareholders, an in-
dependent investment banker who is free of the usual structural bi-
ases260 will help insure that the going private transaction is fair to the
minority. The likelihood of fairness will further increase if the courts
hold the investment banker to a standard of reasonable care in the
preparation of the opinion. Moreover, when the corporation hires the
investment banker specifically to render an opinion for the benefit of
the minority, a stronger basis exists for recognizing a fiduciary
relationship.261
256. See 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1909-10.
257. If management does not have a controlling interest, however, an independent bidder
could successfully initiate its own tender offer. See 15 SEc. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) at 1909
(Stokely-Van Camp's management, after receiving an investment banker's opinion that $55 per
share was "fair and attractive," offered to buy-out all public shareholders; subsequently, Quaker
Oats made a successful tender offer at $77 per share).
258. Such suits apparently would fail under Delaware law because the shareholder would only
challenge the sufficiency of the price offered. In that case, appraisal is held to be an adequate
remedy. If there is a gross disparity, however, between the price offered by an outside party and
the price offered by the controlling shareholder, constructive fraud may be found. See 457 A.2d at
715; supra notes 127-44.
259. 457 A.2d at 713.
260. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 213-47 and accompanying text.
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B. Effect on Rule 10b-5
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger may affect
the application of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934262 and rule lOb-5.263 Specifically it may affect the recognition of
federal disclosure violations that entail breaches of fiduciary duty in
connection with corporate mergers. 264
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,265 the Supreme Court refused to
recognize a claim based solely on breach of fiduciary duty as actionable
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.2 66 The Santa Fe Court held that
"the transaction was neither deceptive nor manipulative and therefore
did not violate either [section] 10(b) or Rule lOb-5." 2 67 In addition, the
court indicated that the majority shareholder's failure to give the mi-
262. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
Section 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
Id
263. Rule lOb-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means of
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mail, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceipt upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
264. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); infra notes 272-73 and
accompanying text.
265. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
266. Id at 471. In Santa Fe, minority shareholders objected to the terms of a short-term
merger pursuant to Delaware statute. In lieu of pursuing their appraisal remedies, the sharehold-
ers commenced an action on behalf of the corporation and other minority shareholders seeking to
set aside the merger or to recover the alleged full value of their shares. Id at 466-67.
267. Id at 474. For law review articles discussing Santa Fe and its progeny, see, eg., Block &
Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement and Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Santa Fe v. Green, 2
CoRp. L. REv. 91 (1979); Campbell, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green: An Analsis Two Years
Later, 30 ME. L. REv. 187 (1978); Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 21; Jacobs, Rule 10b-5 and Sef
Dealing by Corporate Fiduciaries: An Analysis, 48 U. CIN. L. Rav. 643 (1979); Note, Suits for
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nority advance notice of the merger did not constitute a material non-
disclosure. The Court reasoned that "under Delaware law [the
plaintiffs] could not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal
proceeding [was] their sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any al-
leged unfairness in the terms of the merger. '268
Viewing Santa Fe as a "confirmation by the Supreme Court of the
responsibility of a state to govern the internal affairs of corporate
life,"269 the Delaware Supreme Court held in Singer v. Magnavox
Co.270 that appraisal was not a minority shareholder's sole remedy for
alleged unfairness.27' Concomitantly, a number of federal courts, per-
ceiving that minority shareholders now had an expanded right to seek
redress in state courts, recognized a federal right to the information
necessary to determine whether the majority had breached its fiduciary
duty under state law. According to these courts, as represented by the
Second Circuit in Goldberg v. Merdor,272 the failure to provide minor-
ity shareholders with such information was a material "deception"
within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.273
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1874 (1978).
268. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
269. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 n.6 (Del. 1977).
270. Id
271. Id. at 980. See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). See generally Ferrara & Steinberg,
supra note 22, at 78.
272. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). The Goldberg rationale is
not confined to the merger context. It conceivably extends to any transaction involving a purchase
or sale of securities, which, if adequate information had been disclosed, the minority would have
been, entitled to seek state court relief to enjoin the contemplated transaction. See Ferrara &
Steinberg, supra note 22, at 286; Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement in the Federal Securities Act's
Anti-FraudProvisions: A Familiar Path with Some New Detours, 20 B.C.L. REV. 819 (1979); Sher-
rard, Federal Judicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 695 (1978); Note, Goldberg v. Meridor. The Second Circuits Resurrection of Rule
10b-5 Liabilityfor Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders, 64 VA. L. REV.
765 (1978); Note, Securities Regulation Liabilityfor Corporate Mismanagement Under Rule 10b-5
After Santa Fe v. Green, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 269 (1980).
273. See supra note 264. See also Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
This principle is subject to a number of limitations. First, rule lOb-5 claims that are premised on
the deception of the corporation in a securities transaction call for a showing that the corporation
was "disabled from availing itself of an informed judgment on the part of its board regarding the
merits of the transaction." Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (quoting with approval Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970)). See,
eg., Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1978); Lavin v. Data Systems Analysis,
Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aft'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978); Stedman v. Storer,
308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Second, if disinterested board members who have been
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Because in most situations Weinberger limits a minority shareholder
to the appraisal remedy, the question becomes whether actions predi-
cated on the Goldberg rationale remain viable. Although such actions
may be less successful in the post- Weinberger period, a plaintiff may
still bring a Goldberg-type action when the complainant satisfies the
more onerous Weinberger requirements for establishing an entitlement
to state injunctive relief.27 4 As Weinberger made clear, minority share-
holders may seek to enjoin the consummation of a merger if they can
show that one of the exceptions applies.275 Hence, although Wein-
berger limits breach of fiduciary duty suits to cases that involve specific
types of misconduct, the Goldberg rationale remains applicable in those
instances.276
Certain federal courts in section 10(b) actions, moreover, have down-
played the importance of the omitted information to the state's deter-
uination of the availability of an injunction and have instead
emphasized the significance of the misleading or omitted information
fully informed of all material facts vote to approve the transaction, the court will attribute their
knowledge to the corporation. In this event, no "deception" occurs within the meaning of rule
l0b-5. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 795 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Schoenbaum v. First-
brook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393
F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1964). Therefore,
nondisclosure provides the basis for a claim of corporate deception in a derivative action under
rule lOb-5 only if corporate action requires shareholder approval or if the directors are interested
or disabled. Third, in most circumstances, management has no duty to disclose its true purpose or
to characterize the transaction in pejorative terms. See Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Prods., Inc., 597
F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1979) (failure to disclose that purpose of merger was to freeze out minority
shareholders not actionable under sections 10(b) and 14(a)); O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 60 (7th Cir. 1979) (failure to reveal that investment advice was self-
serving not actionable under section 10(b)); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218 n.8 (2d Cir.
1977) ("We do not mean to suggest that § 10(b) or Rule lob-5 requires insiders to characterize the
conflict of interest transactions with pejorative nouns or adjectives."); Gluck v. Agemian, 495 F.
Supp. 1209, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("disclosure of subjective motive is not required under the fed-
eral securities laws"); Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (failure
to disclose that true purpose of tender offer was to consolidate managements control not actiona-
ble under sections 10(b) and 14(e)); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349,
1364 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (failure to disclose breach of fiduciary duty in scheme to undervalue com-
pany not actionable under section 10(b)). See also Steinberg, The "True Purpose" Cases, 5 Copp.
L. REv. 249 (1982).
274. See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. See also Berger & Allingham, supra note
109, at 6-8, 4-15.
276. In those circumstances, an injunction of the merger remains a possibility and, therefore, a
federal right to the information necessary to determine the basis of such a suit remains viable. See
supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
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from the perspective of the investor. For example, in United States v.
Margala,277 the Ninth Circuit made clear a section 10(b) claim may be
based on grounds other than those that would support a state court
action for injunctive relief. Accordingly, a fact is material if a reason-
able investor "could respond to the fact's disclosure by protecting him-
self from possible financial loss.' ' 278
Despite the foregoing language, a plaintiffs entitlement to federal
court relief under the Goldberg rationale depends upon the type of
showing a court will require the plaintiff to make on the availability of
state court injunctive relief. For example, the Second Circuit at a pre-
vious point in time merely required the plaintiff to show the bare avail-
ability of state court injunctive relief.2 7 9 This standard is too lax. Such
an approach frequently allows shareholders who primarily seek to dis-
pute value, which is a traditional state law matter, to bring a federal
suit, and thereby circumvent the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe.
Although it may be argued that most Goldb erg actions primarily in-
volve disputes over value, a distinction exists between purely value dis-
putes and material nondisclosures by the majority that lull minority
shareholders into inaction. Such material nondisclosures can induce
the minority shareholders to refrain from procuring an injunction
against the merger or taking other measures to protect themselves from
financial loss. Without a sufficient showing that the minority was lulled
into such inaction by the majority's nondisclosures, the state appraisal
proceeding, if not unduly cumbersome or expensive to invoke and if
capable of determining fair value in a financially realistic manner, pro-
vides adequate protection to minority stockholders. Furthermore,
traditional notions of federalism relegate corporate internal affairs to
the states.280 In adhering to this policy, the federal courts should not
277. 662 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1981).
278. Id at 626 (citing SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1331-32 (5th Cir. 1978)). See Wright v.
Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
279. But see Madison Consultants v. FDIC [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,239 (2nd Cir. 1983) (the Second Circuit has now rejected this standard and has
adopted the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' view).
280. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977), cited with approval
in Singer, 380 A.2d at 976, n.6; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 612 (1971). As the Supreme Court stated in Santa Fe.
"[C]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors
on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to shareholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
430 U.S. at 479.
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intrude unnecessarily into state court protections absent congressional
direction.
The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits currently require. plaintiffs
who bring a section 10(b), Goldberg-type action to prove the success of
their state court suit by a fair preponderance of the evidence.281 By
requiring plaintiffs to prove that a state court would have awarded re-
lief, the federal courts condition the existence of a federal right under
section 10(b) solely on the applicable state law. The federal interests in
uniformity282 and in full and fair disclosure counsel against the use of
this standard. Moreover, this standard may well be impractical to ad-
minister because it requires plaintiffs to undertake the burden of a full-
blown trial on the state claim.283 Due to these harsh consequences, this
standard provides minority shareholders with inadequate protection
under federal law.
The Third and Fifth Circuits embrace a more moderate view. The
Third Circuit requires plaintiffs to show a "reasonable probability of
ultimate success."' 28 4 This standard conforms to the wording of the
Delaware Chancery Court in David . Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus-
tries, Inc.28 5 The Fifth Circuit requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a "rea-
sonable basis for state relief."2 6 In part, because these standards
conform with the actual standards state courts use to determine the
281. See Madison Consultants v. FDIC, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,239 (2d Cir. 1981); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer
Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
282. See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 829-35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939 (196 1); Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874, 1891-93 (1978).
283. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit dis-
agreed with this standard for two reasons: "First, we believe absolute certainty to be both an
impossible goal as well as an impracticable standard for a jury to implement. Second, in most
cases the state remedy will be a preliminary injunction, which looks to the likelihood of ultimate
success." Id at 647.
284. Id
285. 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
286. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co., Inc. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980). The court stated:
We hold that all that is required to establish lob-5 liability is a showing that state law
remedies were available and that the facts shown make out a prima facie case for relief;
it is not necessary to go further and prove that the state action would have been success-
ful .... [T]he plaintiff must show that there is at least a reasonable basis for state relief,
but need not prove that the state suit would in fact have been successful.
Id at 614.
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availability of injunctive relief, they represent the preferable view.287
Moreover, although the existence of a federal right remains dependent
on the applicable state law,28s this standard sufficiently recognizes the
federal interest in adequate and fair disclosure. Significantly, however,
the standard does not inordinately intrude into areas that are tradition-
ally within the province of state corporate law.289
IX. CONCLUSION
Although Weinberger represents a retreat from the Delaware
Supreme Court's expansion of minority shareholder protection after
Singer, it arguably offers a more rational and cohesive framework to
the freeze-out merger dilemma. Singer's business purpose requirement
failed to provide consistent results because the majority often could ad-
vance a legitimate purpose for a merger in hindsight and because the
inquiry into business purpose itself needlessly diverted the court's at-
tention from the more important issues of fair dealing and fair price.
287. The Third Circuit's position in Healey, and the Fifth Circuit's approach in Alabama
Farm appear to set a more stringent standard than that required to survive a motion under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted or a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Compare the Healey and Alabama
Farm standards with the discussion below of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.
The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a motion for summary judg-
ment under Rule 56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test whether
there is a genuine issue of material fact. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as has been men-
tioned above, only tests whether the claim has been adequately stated in the complaint.
Thus, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court's inquiry essentially is limited to the
content of the complaint; summary judgment, on the other hand, involves the use of
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits. This distinction be-
tween the two provisions is notsubstantial, however, because Rule 12(b)(6) provides that
if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment ...
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1356 (1969).
288. See M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 22, at 191-94; Ferrara &
Steinberg, supra note 21, at 292-94; Comment, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit'r Resur-
rection of Rule 10b-5 Liabilityfor Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholder,
64 VA. L. REv. 765, 772-77 (1978).
289. The facts of Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co., Inc., v. American Fidelity Life
Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), support the availability of a federal suit if material non-
disclosure is involved. In that case, the corporation repurchased its own stock as part of an alleged
plan by the management to perpetuate its own control by artificially raising the market price of its
stock and discouraging takeover attempts. Because the defendants had allegedly failed to disclose
the inflationary effect of the stock repurchase plan on the market price of the corporation's out-
standing shares, the Fifth Circuit found sufficient basis for a derivative suit based on deception
under rule lOb-5. The court used the "reasonable basis for state relief' standard to find that the
alleged nondisclosure was material.
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After Weinberger, courts will focus on the fairness of the merger, with
price being the most important consideration in a nonfraudulent trans-
action. The courts should adopt a pragmatic approach and utilize their
discretion to fashion remedies to obtain just results.
The Weinberger decision is essentially an economic one designed to
facilitate mergers. The court appears to create a presumption of fair-
ness if the parties structure the terms of the merger so as to require
informed majority of the minority shareholder approval or the use of
an independent negotiating committee. When the merger is so struc-
tured and the majority has fully and fairly disclosed, the element of fair
dealing will frequently be satisfied and, therefore, price becomes the
only issue. The result thus signifies a further departure from a vested
property rights theory29 of a stockholder's interest in his shares. Ac-
cordingly, the shareholder's rights are relegated to the status of receiv-
ing the fair value of his shares, except in limited circumstances.
After limiting the minority shareholder's interest in his shares to
their monetary value, the Weinberger court liberalized the remedial
formula available in an appraisal proceeding. Shareholders are enti-
tled to their proportionate share in a "going concern" and to rescissory
damages in certain circumstances. Courts now will value stock by any
generally accepted method and exclude only speculative elements of
value that relate to the accomplishment of the merger.
Unfortunately, many appraisal statutes impose harsh procedural re-
quirements of which minority shareholders may not be aware.29' Con-
290. At common law, certain categories of stockholder rights were "vested" and neither the
corporation nor the courts could eliminate or modify these "vested" rights without each share-
holder's consent. See Combes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441-42 (1932) ("neither vested property
rights nor the obligation of contracts of third persons may be destroyed or impaired" pursuant to
the state's reserved power to amend the statute or to authorize a charter amendment); Keller v.
Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936) (dividend arrears are vested and therefore not
alterable through a charter amendment). But see Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del.
Ch. 514, 522, 154 A.2d 893, 897 (1959) (endorsing a broad view of the state's reserved power to
amend the statute); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 335, 11 A.2d 331, 339
(1940) (although not specifically overruling the vested rights theory, court found that dividend
arrears may be modified in the course of a merger); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 DeL
Ch. 157, 142 A. 654 (1928). See generallyE. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
559-60 (1971) ("if corporate action conforms both substantively and procedurally to the require-
ments of the statute, it is likely that no interests affected by such actions will be demoninated as
vested.").
291. "The procedure has grown long and expensive and... courts have tended to be increas-
ingly stringent in enforcing the procedural letter of the [appraisal] statutes. Moreover, the only
things certain [in the appraisal process] are the uncertainty, the delay and the expense." Manning,
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sequently, because courts require shareholders to perfect their rights
under the applicable statute to obtain an appraisal, these statutes
should require the corporation to provide clear and timely notice to the
shareholder of the requirements for invoking the appraisal remedy.
292
Furthermore, legislatures should review the numerous procedural ele-
ments and eliminate those that merely serve to burden the minority.
Only if the burden of compliance with the appraisal statute is lightened
will the new appraisal remedy provide meaningful protection for the
minority shareholder.
supra note 23, at 231, 233. Manning believes that although legislatures first viewed appraisal
statutes as protecting the civil liberties of the minority, in actual use, the statutes have resulted in
"giving greater mobility of action to the majority." Id at 227. The availability of an appraisal
remedy frees the majority from the risk of an injunction in certain instances and "relegates the
[dissenting] shareholder's claim of'ownership' to the status of a fungible dollar claim." Id at 228-
30. "Among the other drawbacks of appraisal is that all the dissenting stockholders must continue
to hold their shares, without receiving the merger consideration, even though they lose their rights
as stockholders." Prickett & Hanrahan, supra note 101, at 74, n.1 15. Compare Keller v. Wilson &
Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936) (plaintiffdid not have an appraisal remedy; court granted
injunction) with Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940) (plaintiff
failed to acquire an injunction and the court limited him to his appraisal remedy). See also Hof-
fenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943); supra note 74.
292. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (Replacement Vol. 1983). See also Raabs v.
Villager Indus., Inc., 355 A.2d 888 (Del. Ch. 1976) (holding that the corporation must give specific
instructions to the shareholders explaining how to file objections and how to make demands for
payment). But see CAL. CORP. CODE § 1301(a) (West 1977) (notice by the corporation ofappraisal
rights only required in case of reorganization); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.70 (Smith-Hurd
1983-84 Supp.) (no corporate notice of appraisal remedy required). Under federal law, Schedule
13e-3, item 13(a) requires the following notice:
State whether or not appraisal rights are provided under applicable state law or under
the issuer's articles of incorporation or will be voluntarily accorded by the issuer or affili-
ate to security holders in connection with the Rule 13e-3 transaction and, if so, summa-
rize such appraisal rights. If appraisal rights will not be available, under the applicable
state law, to security holders who object to the transaction, briefly outline the rights
which may be available to such security holders under such law.
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